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Abstract 
 
An individual from a relatively affluent country is presumably hardly surprised by hearing 
about stories that depict global labour injustices. We are aware of the fact that there are 
people in other countries who work under abhorrent ‘sweatshop’ conditions and we know that 
these circumstances are still more pervasive than we would like them to be. In this way, 
global labour injustices amount to a morally unacceptable state of affairs for which there is an 
urgent need for remedy. What role should an individual play in providing this remedy?  
 In this thesis, I argue that individuals incur remedial responsibility for global labour 
injustices by virtue of being connected as consumers. I attempt to answer the question 
whether consumers should consume ethically in order to discharge these responsibilities. 
First, I discuss accounts of responsibility as put forward by Iris Marion Young and David 
Miller. Due to dissatisfaction with Young’s account of political responsibility, I adopt Miller’s 
framework of the connection theory of remedial responsibility. As a result of the application 
of the connection theory, it appears that corporations are most strongly connected to these 
injustices. However, given their objectionable inaction as well as their sensitivity to consumer 
preferences, I argue that a considerable share of remedial responsibility falls on consumers. I 
then go on to consider whether consumers should discharge their remedial responsibilities 
through ethical consumerism. Upon first consideration, it seems that consumers should not 
discharge their remedial responsibility as consumers by attempting to consume ethically in 
order to affect demand. I conclude that this would be an excessively burdensome as well as 
inefficacious task. Subsequently, I argue that this reasoning nevertheless presupposes that the 
only impact consumption choices will have, is by directly affecting consumer demand. This 
reasoning thereby neglects the normative expressive value of consumption choices. 
Furthermore, I argue that individual consumers ought to take steps towards collectivisation. 
Among the steps an individual ought to take is signalling a willingness to come together and 
act collectively. Ultimately, I conclude that one of the ways individuals can engage in 
signalling, is by employing the normative expressive function of their consumption choices.   
iii
Abstract in Norwegian 
Rapporter og fortellinger om global arbeidsurettferdighet har sluttet å overaske individer fra 
relativt velstående land. Vi er klare over at det er folk i andre land som arbeider under 
forferdelige forhold (såkalte ‘sweatshop conditions’) og vi vet at disse forholdene er mer 
utbredt enn det de burde være. Global arbeidsurettferdighet utgjør en moralsk uakseptabel 
situasjon med et sårt behov for godtgjørelse. Spørsmålet er hvilken rolle individet skal spille i 
en slik godtgjørelse?  
 I denne tesen argumentere jeg for at individer pådrar seg et godtgjørelsesansvar 
(‘remedial responsibility’) i kraft av å være en forbruker tilknyttet til global 
arbeidsurettferdighet. Jeg forsøker å svare på spørsmålet om forbrukere er forpliktet til å 
handle etisk for å avbøte dette godtgjørelsesansvaret. Jeg skal derfor drøfte Iris Marion Young 
og David Millers utredning av ansvar. Jeg adopterer Millers tilknytningsteori for 
godtgjørelsesansvar som en modell for ansvar, ettersom jeg finner Youngs utredning av 
politisk ansvar utilfredsstillende. Et resultat av å anvende Millers tilknytningsteori er at 
bedrifter og selskaper, i motsetning til forbrukere og individer, virker sterkest tilknyttet global 
arbeidsurettferdighet. Gitt deres klanderverdige uvirksomhet og deres sensitivitet til 
forbrukeres preferanser, argumenterer jeg for at en betraktelig andel av godtgjørelsesansvar 
faller på forbrukere. Videre skal jeg betrakte etisk konsumerisme som botemiddel for 
forbrukeres godtgjørelsesansvar. Det kan virke som om å praktisere etisk konsumerisme for å 
dermed senke etterspørsel ikke er et attraktivt bøtemiddel for godtgjørelsesansvar, ettersom 
det ville være både krevende og ineffektivt. Videre, argumenterer jeg for at et slikt 
resonnement likevel forutsetter at den eneste effekten etisk konsumerisme vil ha er å direkte 
påvirke forbrukerens etterspørsel. Resonnementet overser nemlig den normative verdien 
utrykket ved forbrukerens valg. Jeg argumenterer for at den individuelle forbrukeren bør ta 
steg mot kollektivisering, som blant annet å signalisere en villighet til å komme sammen å 
handle kollektivt. Avslutningsvis konkluderer jeg med at en av måtene et individ kan 
signalisere en slik villighet er i funksjon av det normative uttrykket av forbrukerens valg. 
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As a citizen from a relatively affluent Western country, one is often confronted–perhaps not 
often enough–with stories about the dire situation of poor and exploited workers from all 
across the globe. Sadly, there are countless examples of news stories that illustrate these 
workers’ situations. There are news articles that report on how the garment factory workers of 
Gap, Zara and H&M earns less than one fifth of what is considered to be a living wage.  1
There are female workers of garment factories who describe that physical and sexual abuse is 
part of their daily reality.  In addition, there are people who work in garment factories who 2
are exposed to toxic chemicals on a daily basis. Such exposure to the toxins used in garment 
production can lead to heart disease, birth defects, skin conditions and cancers.  Moreover, 3
there are also many stories of workers dying due to unsafe working conditions. The collapse 
of the Rana Plaza in Bangladesh is perhaps the most known example of this.  A day after the 4
walls of the garment factory began to show cracks, thousands of workers came back to work 
fearing they would lose their jobs if they did not return. The Rana Plaza eventually collapsed 
and more than 1100 people died. The victims in such stories are not limited to adults. There 
are stories that report on how the coffee beans of Starbucks and Nestlé’s Nespresso are 
picked by children as young as eight years old.  Despite the fact that these companies claim 5
to have a zero tolerance policy with regard to child labour, some children do this demanding 
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work eight hours a day for six days a week.  Another story involves a company named 6
Foxconn, a Chinese firm that produces Apple’s iPhones. Workers committed suicide by 
throwing themselves from the factory buildings at such a frequent rate that Foxconn decided 
to erect suicide nets around the outsides of their factory buildings.  When confronted with 7
similar stories and visual imagery depicting these workers’ realities, it becomes very hard to 
deny that these people’s stories amount to severe injustices.  
The work of the previously discussed electronics and garment workers is often 
referred to as ‘sweatshop labour’. Sweatshops are generally characterised by physically 
demanding labour, strict rules, long working hours, forced overtime, dangerous working 
conditions and an absence of job security as well as health benefits.  Sweatshop labour is a 8
large scale and complex problem that might very well seem insolvable in the eyes of a 
relatively affluent individual taken in isolation. This can partly be ascribed to the fact that a 
complex global issue is neither caused nor solved by a single acting agent. Complex global 
problems such as sweatshops are often the result of historical processes and power relations 
that took years, decades or sometimes even centuries to come into being. Nevertheless, an 
individual, when confronted with a complex global problem such as sweatshop labour, might 
ask him- or herself: What should I do in the face of the complex problem at hand? 
 One way in which it seems as if individuals bear some responsibilities for complex 
global issues such as sweatshop labour, is through the fact that they are bombarded with 
messages about ethical consumerism. In this way, consumers are often confronted with 
ethical considerations. For example, these considerations concern the way consumers shop, 
what they eat, what clothes they wear as well as how they travel from one place to another. 
Should one boycott a brand that has been linked to a scandal? Should one stop eating meat? 
Can one still wear clothes from sweatshop brands? Should one go on holiday by train? For 
the consumer who wants to be more ethically conscious about their consumption, consuming 
poses a challenge. Products and services are being advertised for their sustainability and 
brands use their Corporate Social Responsibility programmes for marketing purposes. 
 . Doward, “Children.” 6
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Consider two examples by way of illustration. Firstly, for many of the fast-moving consumer 
goods, it seems to be the case that the responsibility to consume harm-free products partly 
falls on the consumer. For example, one and the same brand could offer regular eggs and 
free-range eggs; regular chocolate and fair-trade chocolate; regular oat milk and organic oat 
milk; fast-fashion and conscious-fashion. Taking this into account, it does not seem as if the 
companies that produce these goods take up all the responsibility towards reaching certain 
ethical standards. Instead, to some extent this choice is left for the consumer to make. The 
second illustrative case revolves around an oil company’s corporate social responsibility 
program. Wrapped in a competition show format, Shell recently launched a miniseries 
promoting cleaner ways of traveling. Shell named it ‘The Great Travel Hack’.  This is an oil 9
company that is responsible for having dug up huge amounts of fossil fuels. In fact, while the 
disastrous effects of these actions on the climate are known, Shell continues to do so. At the 
same time, Shell promotes more ‘climate-friendly’ ways of traveling to their consumers. In 
this way, they seemingly leave it up to consumers to change their behaviour. Both this 
example about Shell as well as the other example, show that it appears to be the case that an 
individual from an affluent country should consider the moral side effects of their 
consumption choices.  
What, if any, responsibilities does an individual from a relatively affluent country 
have in light of complex global problems such as sweatshop labour? One possible answer is 
that consumers from relatively affluent countries have a responsibility to avoid products from 
sweatshops. This view seems to presuppose that consumers would at least partly be 
responsible for the ethical repercussions connected to the products they consume. Hence, this 
would imply that an individual from a relatively affluent country who purchases sweatshop 
items, carries some responsibility for the harms involved in sweatshop production. However, 
is it appropriate to hold individuals responsible for the injustices that precede their 
consumption in light of the complexity of this problem? After all, consumers might think that 
their individual contributions do not matter. Besides, consumers might not be aware of the 
circumstances under which their products were manufactured, nor do they intend to produce 
these circumstances. Moreover, if it turns out that it would be appropriate to hold individuals 
responsible, then the question arises what actions an individual should take in order to 
 . “The Great Travel Hack,” Shell, accessed March 13, 2020, https://www.shell.com/make-9
the-future/cleaner-mobility/the-great-travel-hack.html.
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discharge their responsibility? 
 In this thesis, I will argue that individuals who have consumed products that can be 
traced to these global labour injustices indeed bear some responsibility for them. 
Correspondingly, I will argue that one of the ways that individuals can discharge this 
responsibility is by consuming ethically. However, discharging remedial responsibility by 
consuming ethically is not justified in the way some might intuitively think it is. I will 
proceed as follows. In the first chapter, I will discuss the topic of responsibility. Here, I will 
consider the framework of Iris Marion Young, who has made important contributions to the 
discussions about responsibility and global labour injustices.  In various ways, I will be 10
expanding on as well as criticising her account of political responsibility. Ultimately, I will 
adopt David Miller’s account of the connection theory of remedial responsibility.  11
Subsequently, I will apply Miller’s framework to the case of sweatshops. It appears that while 
there are various agents who stand in connection to sweatshops, these connections vary in 
strength. Upon consideration, it will turn out that corporations seem to be the most strongly 
connected to these injustices and should therefore be principle bearers of remedial 
responsibility. However, due to the objectionable inaction of corporations, I will argue that 
consumers incur a larger share of remedial responsibility than they would otherwise have 
incurred.  
 In the second chapter, I attempt to answer the question how consumer should 
discharge their remedial responsibility. One obvious answer would be that because of the fact 
that consumers incur remedial responsibility by virtue of being consumers, they should also 
discharge their remedial responsibility as consumers, by attempting to influence consumer 
demand. I will discuss three arguments against this position. First, I will consider the 
argument stating that this kind of ethical consumerism would circumvent important 
democratic processes as well as values. Then, I will analyse the complexity and 
demandingness of discharging remedial responsibility in this way. Lastly, I discuss the 
efficacy of this way of discharging responsibilities. Whereas the first argument will not turn 
out to be a satisfying reason for why consumers should not discharge remedial responsibility 
by directly aiming to affect demand through their consumption choices, the latter two 
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 365-88. 10
 . David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (New York: Oxford University 11
Press, 2007),  97-104. 
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arguments lead to the conclusion that it would be an excessively demanding as well as 
ineffective way of discharging remedial responsibilities. 
 Given the arguments in the previous chapter, we are left with the question of how 
individual consumers should discharge their remedial responsibility. In the last chapter, I 
discuss some forms of political action. In addition, I consider an account of group duties. 
This discussion leads to the conclusion that consumers ought to take steps towards 
collectivisation. Next, I examine the role that signalling plays in light of collectivisation. 
Given the observation that many of the ways that individuals attempt to affect outcomes are 
mediated, I conclude that consumers can also employ the normative expressive function of 
their consumption choices. Ultimately, I conclude that one of the ways that individual 
consumers ought to discharge their remedial responsibility is by signalling a willingness to 
collectivise through their ethical consumption choices. By means of conclusion, I provide 
some reflections, discuss a few of the implications of my conclusions and raise some 




Chapter 1  
Responsibility 
In order to find a conclusive answer to the question which agent (or group of agents) bears 
responsibility in light of global labour injustices, there is a need to reflect on the concept of 
responsibility itself. When the aim is to provide a conclusion about who bears responsibility, 
it is important to first determine what concept of responsibility is operational in matters such 
as these. Since the objective here is to determine what relatively affluent individuals ought to 
do, an account of responsibility is needed that can be applied in order to reach a conclusion 
about which agents ought to act. Therefore, what is needed is an account of responsibility that 
is to some degree action guiding. I will first entertain Young’s notion of political 
responsibility before I consider Miller’s account of remedial responsibility. I will argue that 
Young’s conception seems unable to provide us with satisfying and action guiding outcomes. 
Hence, I will turn to Miller and discuss his conception of remedial responsibility at greater 
length. Although Miller does not discuss matters of global labour injustice, he can be read as 
providing a kind of framework that is more detailed than Young’s. Therefore, I will apply 
Miller’s framework to Young’s discussion of global labour injustice and eventually draw 
conclusions from this application.  
1.1 Young 
In her landmark paper discussing the issue of responsibility in light of global labour injustices 
such as sweatshop labour, Young starts off with the question whether “people in relatively 
free and affluent countries . . . have responsibilities to try to improve working conditions and 
wages of workers in far-off parts of the world who produce items those in the more affluent 
countries purchase”.  Young aimed at theorising a conception of responsibility that could 12
make sense of the claims of responsibility which were made by the anti-sweatshop movement 
at the time. She argued that conventional reasoning in terms of holding agents responsible 
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 365.12
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who are ‘liable’ or ‘at fault’, is insufficient for dealing with large global problems as complex 
as sweatshop labour. When one adopts a fault liability model for assigning responsibilities, 
responsibilities are assigned to those agents who are causally connected to the matter at hand 
unless the causal connection was involuntary. On a strict liability model of responsibility, 
voluntariness does not play a role in assigning responsibilities. On the latter conception, an 
agent is even liable for unintended outcomes or outcomes produced by someone under their 
command. When these models are applied to the phenomena of sweatshops, it becomes clear 
why they appear to be insufficient. 
 In the case of sweatshop labour, the harms that are being inflicted upon the exploited 
workers are first and foremost the fault of the people who run these sweatshop, Young 
argues.  These employers are in control of what happens in their factories and are in charge 13
of ‘making up the rules’ as one would say. Working hours, salary and safety are just a few 
examples of labour conditions for which employers would primarily be responsible. This is 
true on the fault as well as the strict liability account of responsibility. However, when 
confronted with the wrongs that occur in their factories, Young proceeds, these employers 
might very well attempt “to mitigate their responsibility by appeal to factors outside their 
control”.  While blaming the highly competitive environment they operate in, these 14
employers may claim that they, too, wish they could change the treatment of their workers for 
the better. Due to the constraints imposed upon them by a highly competitive, ‘race-to-the-
bottom’ market environment which is outside of the employers’ control, employers simply 
claim that they have to operate under these unfavourable conditions if they want to stay in 
business. However, Young adds, “[n]o employer can legitimately excuse making people work 
sixteen-hour days, refusing them bathroom breaks, or beating them, as necessary for keeping 
the costs of production competitive.”  Therefore, employer’s appeals to mitigate their 15
responsibility for the wrongs in their factories by blaming their financially constrained 
positions are only justified to a certain extent. Nevertheless, these sweatshop employers 
might reasonably claim that they are unable to improve working conditions such as safety, 
wages and working hours given their financial constraints. In turn, Young writes, these 
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 365-88. 13
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 369. 14
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 369.15
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employers might point to their states and claim that they should be responsible for 
safeguarding a level playing field between different manufacturers by imposing as well as 
enforcing strict regulations. 
  Analogously, however, these states might point to their own constrained positions.  16
Governments, like employers, might argue that they fear losing investments and jobs if they 
would try to improve the working conditions in their countries. After all, the businesses that  
place the orders could choose for an alternative, more cost-effective producer in another 
country. In this way, it seems to be the case that different actors could (at least to some 
degree) legitimately point towards the other actors at play, aiming to acquit their faulty but 
severely constrained way of acting. Therefore, Young notes that these agents’ constraints 
show that there are underlying structural economic and political processes that are of 
influence in matters such as sweatshop labour.  According to Young, these “structural 17
conditions provide incentives for setting up and buying from manufacturing operations that 
violate worker rights”.  She suggests that in cases such as these, in which there seem to be 18
problematic structural constraints, conventional reasoning along the lines of liability and fault 
does not suffice when it comes to adjudicating responsibilities. In this way, Young does not 
deny that we might be able to identify some agents who are at fault or who are liable. 
Although there might be good reasons for condemning sweatshop owners for the unjust 
treatment of their workers, Young argues that is not likely to change the structures that have 
led to the harms in the first place. Therefore, Young claims that a complete analysis of the 
injustice as well as an analysis of the corresponding responsibilities should be sensitive to the 
structural dimensions at play.  
 When it comes to analyses of structural processes, Young argues that we should 
supplement the fault and strict liability understandings of responsibility with a conception of 
‘political responsibility’.  According to Young, when people claim that individuals from 19
affluent countries bear responsibilities to distant sweatshop workers, we should think of these 
individuals as having some political responsibility. Agents can bear this type of responsibility 
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 369-70. 16
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 370. 17
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 375.  18
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 375. 19
8
even though they are not the principal offenders on a fault or strict liability model of 
responsibility. Young details five ways in which political responsibility is distinct from 
conventional thinking about responsibility.  In the way Young proposes, political 20
responsibility is distinct from other conceptions of responsibility in that, among other things, 
it does not seek to single out agents who are responsible from those who are not.  Whereas 21
criminal law aims to isolate a perpetrator who subsequently subject to blame and punishment, 
political responsibility is a type of responsibility that even applies for things we have not 
done. Complex global problems such as sweatshop labour “have no isolatable perpetrator, but 
rather result from the participation of millions of people in institutions and practices that 
result in harms.”  Therefore, identifying some agents who bear responsibility for the harms 22
of sweatshop labour does not exempt others for being responsible in this way too. In addition, 
political responsibility compels us to question the baseline of what is morally acceptable.  23
Due to the fact that structural injustices are the result of millions of people acting in a 
particular manner that for them is business as usual, but which yet produces unacceptable 
harms, political responsibility aims to question the background conditions that allow these 
harms to endure. In this sense, political responsibility is different from a liability conception 
of responsibility. Whereas the latter commences from a deviation from what is normal and 
acceptable (i.e. laws), the former specifically challenges this baseline. Thirdly, political 
responsibility is more forward-looking than backward-looking.  Whereas our justice system, 24
for example, is mostly concerned with what has occurred and seeks to identify which agents 
played a role in that, political responsibility aims at bringing about results. Sanctioning and 
blaming the millions of people involved in structurally bringing about an injustice does not 
seem feasible or appropriate. This does especially seem inappropriate given the fact that 
avoiding being implicated in those covert structures is virtually impossible. Hence, the 
emphasis of political responsibility resides in that it is a future oriented responsibility and 
aims at altering the structures that produce unwanted outcomes. Moreover, Young’s 
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 377-80. 20
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 377. 21
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 377. 22
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 377.  23
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 378. 24
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conception of political responsibility is open towards what counts as discharging this 
responsibility.  Unlike duties that clearly instruct one to, for example, not harm others or to 25
obey the law, political responsibility is not specified in a way that prescribes how to discharge 
one’s responsibility. Lastly, Young conceives of political responsibility as a shared 
responsibility rather than a collective responsibility.  When a group of agents has a collective 26
responsibility, it does not mean that all the agents who constitute this group are individually 
responsible as well. In contrast, when a group of agents is politically responsible, each one of 
these agents has a personal responsibility. Young argues that by supplementing conventional 
reasoning about responsibility with this shared conception of responsibility, it “allows us to 
call on one another to take responsibility together for the fact that our actions collectively 
assume and contribute to the complex structural processes that enable the working conditions 
we deplore and make them difficult for any single agent to change”.  27
On Young’s conception of political responsibility, structural injustices such sweatshop 
labour, demand us to reason appropriately about the shared responsibilities we have. Here, 
Young suggests people ought to reason about and reflect on “their action in relation to 
structural injustice along parameters of connection, power, and privilege”.  On Young’s 28
framework, the way an individual is connected to an injustice plays an important role in 
discerning the degree to which an individual bears political responsibility. According to 
Young, our moral obligations are not limited to the people we know or with whom we share a 
country. In this respect Young’s framework follows Onora O’Neill, who believed that “the 
scope of an agent’s moral obligation extends to all those whom the agent assumes in 
conducting his or her activity”.  Hence, reflecting on the ways we stand in relation to global 29
labour injustices will presumably lead to the conclusion that our connections to sweatshop 
workers result in some responsibility for these injustices. Besides our connections to the 
injustices, Young claims that an individual’s social position in structural processes usually 
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 379.  25
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 380.  26
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 381. 27
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 385. 28
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 371. 29
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comes with some potential power to influence those structures.  For example, a rector of a 30
university holds more power to influence its institutional outcomes than a teaching assistant. 
In a similar way as that individuals have power, organisations and institutions also hold 
power to influence structures and processes. On the topic of institutional power, Young 
claims that while large fashion retailers have more interests in the perpetuation of the status 
quo, they are also likely to be more powerful with respect to influencing outcomes in the 
fashion industry.  In this respect, Young proposes that lesser powerful agents could for 31
instance take responsibility by pressuring the more powerful agents or institutions to take up 
theirs. Furthermore, Young urges us to reflect on our relative privileges compared to the 
victims of injustice.  Although affluent individuals who buy products made in sweatshops 32
might possess little power over structures that produce these outcomes, they are privileged 
due to the fact that they do have more resources to spend and are able to adapt without 
suffering major losses.  Therefore, Young states that people “who benefit relatively from 33
structural inequalities have special moral responsibilities to contribute to organized efforts to 
correct them”.  In this way, connection, power and privilege are grounds that give rise to 34
political responsibility on Young’s account. 
Although Young has developed a framework that is helpful for reasoning about our 
responsibilities regarding those who suffer from injustices, it remains rather unclear how to 
judge how much responsibility an agent bears in respect to other agents as well as how to 
discern actions that might count towards discharging this type of responsibility. This becomes 
clear when we consider the case of a university student whose university sells university 
branded apparel that has been produced in sweatshops. When we reason along the lines of 
connection, surely this student stands in connection with the injustice of sweatshop labour. 
This student attends a university that allows its branded products to be produced in 
deplorable working conditions. However, one could argue that as long as the student does not 
purchase these goods, he or she has less of a connection compared to the students who do 
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 386. 30
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 386.  31
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 387.  32
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 387.   33
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 387.34
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purchase these goods or who work at the university store. It is unclear on Young’s account 
what this would imply for the degree of political responsibility that this student might be said 
to hold. Does this entail that this student is required to do less towards discharging their 
responsibility? Moreover, students have power by virtue of being students. As Young points 
out, there have been examples in the past of students who have put pressure on university 
boards to buy from other manufacturers.  However, it is unclear on Young’s account what 35
actions count towards making ‘enough use’ of one’s power. Does writing a letter to the 
university board discharge one’s responsibility? Should one boycott the university store? 
Should students stop attending classes until the university changes manufacturers? Does 
writing a thesis on responsibilities for global labour injustices count towards discharging 
political responsibility? In addition, a student is also relatively privileged by the mere fact 
that they are able to enjoy an education, while sweatshop workers often have not. However, 
to what extent has this privilege arisen from sweatshop labour? It does not seem to be the 
case that a student can attend university because there are other people working in 
sweatshops. Although it is true that students in affluent countries are privileged in that they 
have more resources compared to sweatshop workers, it is not at all clear how these correlate 
and how much of these resources should subsequently be spend on ameliorating injustice. In 
this way, it seems that the application of Young’s framework on responsibility is unable to 
provide us with action-guiding principles. Therefore, it is not very clear on Young’s account 
what it actually entails to be politically responsible for an injustice. Due to the fact that 
Young deliberately aimed at conceptualising a form of responsibility that is shared by many 
and that is open towards the different ways in which this responsibility might be discharged, 
it remains rather vague what the implications of being politically responsible are. Hence, the 
question arises whether a more specific, action-guiding account is available. 
1.2 Miller 
Interestingly, around the same time that Young wrote about structural injustices and political 
responsibility, David Miller proposed a framework revolving around responsibilities in a 
 . Young, “Responsibility,” 367. 35
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similar vein.  Although the two were both writing about responsibilities, there does not seem 36
to have been an interaction between their works. In his work concerning the distribution of 
responsibilities, Miller put forward an initial version of what he names the ‘connection 
theory’.  While Miller’s initial framework includes slightly different concepts (causal 37
responsibility, moral responsibility, capacity, and community) than the ones Young employs, 
they bear a strong resemblance of each other. The underlying idea seems to be the same: there 
are many different ways in which we stand in relation to people and these relationships might 
very well impose responsibilities on our side. Despite the similarities of the two accounts, 
Miller’s account seems to be more helpful compared to Young’s account in reasoning about 
individual responsibility for global labour justice. While also acknowledging that there are 
subtle differences between their accounts, one could possibly go as far as to argue that 
Miller’s connection theory might be seen as a useful way of specifying some of the ideas that 
were discussed by Young.  
 Without suggesting to provide a definite account of the concept of responsibility, 
Miller puts forward a conception of what he calls ‘remedial responsibility’.  For Miller, 38
remedial responsibility plays a key role in thinking about matters of global justice. Usually, 
the starting point for determining responsibility begins with an agent who has produced a 
certain outcome for which said agent may or may not end up bearing responsibility for based 
on backward-looking considerations. Miller’s remedial responsibility, however, starts from a 
different position. In a sense, it could be argued that it starts from the other direction: there is 
a situation in which there is need for a remedy and therefore there is also a corresponding 
need to determine whose job it is to provide that remedy. Miller’s development of his 
conceptual framework around remedial responsibility is motivated by the fact that there are 
people who fall below a certain threshold of well-being. There are, for instance, people 
starving in faraway countries, there are people being oppressed and there are workers being 
exploited.  In National Responsibility and Global Justice, the book in which he further 39
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develops his account, Miller aims at providing an answer to the question whether affluent 
states and their citizens could possibly be held responsible for remedying the situation of 
suffering people in dire need of help.  It is in this light that Miller introduces his account of 40
remedial responsibility. Remedial responsibility applies to situations in which there is a state 
of affairs in which people suffer and in which it would be morally unacceptable for this 
situation to persist.  Hence, there should be an agent (or agents) who bear the responsibility 41
for remedying it. In this sense, remedial responsibility is conceptually close to Young’s use of 
political responsibility. Both of these accounts are forward looking. As the word ‘remedial’ 
implies, this type of responsibility aims at accomplishing a solution for an unacceptable 
situation or causing an injustice to come to an end. Miller defines what it means to be 
remedially responsible for a situation as having “a special responsibility, either individually 
or along with others, to remedy the position of the deprived or suffering people, one that is 
not equally shared with all agents; and to be liable to sanction (blame, punishment, etc.) if the 
responsibility is not discharged.”   42
 Although Miller’s account does not rule out the possibility that multiple agents can 
bear remedial responsibility at the same time, his account aims at finding the appropriate 
agents who ought to halt the continuation of injustice. This is partly due to the fact that Miller 
does not believe that bearing a tiny fraction of responsibility for a big and complex problem 
is very effective when the goal of assigning responsibility is to accomplish a remedy.  He 43
claims that when responsibility is too widely dispersed, “everyone will attempt to hang back 
in the hope that someone else will step in first, no-one will be particularly liable to censure if 
the bad condition is not remedied, and so on”.  Taking this into consideration, it is helpful to 44
clearly distinguish between identifying responsible agents on the one hand and allocating 
responsibility to particular agents on the other.  When we attempt to identify responsible 45
agents, we consider whether they meet certain relevant criteria for being responsible for 
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producing a particular outcome. Alternatively, in assigning responsibilities we choose to 
single out agents whether or not they fulfil such criteria. At first glance, this might seem to 
contradict our intuitions about responsibility. Why should agents be assigned with 
responsibilities for outcomes they did not produce? However, this is not as uncommon as it 
might first appear. Consider an example that includes a child. If a young child accidentally 
breaks an expensive item, we are likely to assign the responsibility for reimbursing the owner 
for the broken item with the parents of the young child. If in this case the parents were not 
acting negligently through, for instance, not paying close attention to the child, this seems to 
be a case in which the parents cannot be identified as being responsible for the item being 
broken. Yet, the parents are debited with the responsibility to compensate the owner. 
Importantly, Miller points out that unlike “identifications, assignments of responsibility can 
be justified or unjustified, but they cannot be correct or incorrect.”  When we apply this to 46
the case of the young child who breaks an item, it would therefore not be incorrect to expect 
the child to pay for the item. Although there might be exceptional cases in which there are 
contextual factors that weigh in, it does, however, generally seem unjustified to expect the 
child to incur a debt or empty his or her piggy bank for the accident.  
 When we attempt to identify and assign responsibility, we should take into account 
that there exist mitigating circumstances that might relieve agents of their responsibility. 
Miller discusses three types of cases in which this could be the case.  Firstly, there are cases 47
in which agents have acted in a deranged state. If, for example, a person is suffering from a 
mental disorder or is experiencing a psychosis and this deranged mental state leads them to 
inflict harm upon others, we would not be inclined to hold the person fully responsible. 
Similarly, if an agent is manipulated into doing something by another party, and the agent is 
not overly gullible, we would be inclined to relieve the manipulated agent of some of their 
responsibility. In addition, there are cases in which agents are coerced in producing a harmful 
outcome. If, for instance, at gunpoint an agent has to choose between being killed or 
cooperating against their will in producing a harmful outcome for other agents (e.g. 
torturing), the coerced agent is left little choice but to abide. It does not seem that the coerced 
agent carries full responsibility for the outcome in such cases. How much agents are relieved 
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of their responsibility in cases in which derangement, manipulation and coercion play a role, 
is also dependent on other normative considerations. Here, Miller instructs us to apply a 
“standard of reasonable foresight”.  By applying the notion of reasonableness, we are forced 48
to ask ourselves what a reasonable agent could have expected to happen given the 
circumstances. Although this does not rule out disputes over what outcomes could have been 
foreseen, it does allow us to hold agents partly responsible in cases where mitigating 
circumstances apply. People should for instance not be too easily manipulated by being too 
gullible. Similarly, if a person knows about a mental disorder they suffer from and also know 
that certain acts might trigger a deranged mental state in them that might put themselves and 
others in danger of being harmed, it would at least be negligent to risk that outcome. A 
comparison can be made with the act of excessive drinking. A severely drunk person is 
somewhat unaccountable for their drunk acts. However, the person is accountable for 
deciding to drink too much. They could have reasonably foreseen that when they drink too 
much, they might lose control over their behaviour. Together, these are important 
considerations that factor in when determining whether an agent is responsible.  
 Due to fact that Miller is concerned with assigning responsibilities in a way that will 
lead to remedy a morally unacceptable state of affairs, his forward-looking notion of remedial 
responsibility seems to be conceptually akin to having a duty or obligation towards producing 
an outcome. As Miller’s definition of remedial responsibility suggests, to be remedially 
responsible entails having a special responsibility to provide a remedy. Hence, it could be 
said that when an agent is remedially responsible, he or she bears a duty or has an obligation 
to provide said remedy. The question that remains, then, is how to determine whether an 
agent is remedially responsible. In order to identify agents as being remedially responsible 
and thereby impose a special responsibility to provide remedy on them, there is a need for 
criteria with which we can determine where to assign this kind of responsibility. In this light, 
Miller proposes his ‘connection theory’ of remedial responsibility.  Parallel to Young’s 49
framework, Miller’s account instructs us that when it is morally unacceptable for a situation 
to persist, we are urged to reflect on the ways we stand in relation to this situation. Miller 
outlines six of such ways in which an agent can be connected and identified as remedially 
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responsible.  These are moral responsibility, outcome responsibility, causal responsibility, 50
benefit, capacity and community.  
1.3 The Connection Theory of Remedial Responsibility 
The three types of responsibility that Miller includes in his connection theory of remedial 
responsibility, aim to highlight different aspects in which agents can be linked to a particular 
state of affairs. Since Miller’s discussion of outcome responsibility is most elaborate, I will 
consider it first.  In identifying agents who are outcome responsible for an act, we are 51
concerned with fairly distributing benefits and burdens to different agents based on their 
contributions in bringing about that particular outcome. In this way, outcome responsibility 
involves a causal dimension. It is, nevertheless, conceptually distinct from strict causal 
responsibility. Consider the following case about spilling a drink.  If I knock over someone 52
else’s drink because another person bumped into me which caused my arm to hit the table, I 
am causally responsible for the drink being spilled. However, in this case I am not outcome 
responsible due to the fact that I was pushed. It would not seem justified for the other person 
to say that it was my fault or that I am to blame for the fact that the drink was spilled. 
Therefore, in order to be outcome responsible, there seem to be underlying normative 
considerations that apply. Miller has distinguished a few of these considerations.  Besides 53
causal involvement, Miller states that an act should be a manifestation of genuine agency. 
That does not mean that a person needs to intend a certain outcome in order to be responsible. 
One could, for example, act negligently. If I would be dancing wildly without minding the 
people and objects around me and in the process I spill drinks and hit people, I would still be 
outcome responsible. This is the case regardless of whether I intended these things to happen. 
However, even if an agent did not intend an outcome and was not behaving negligently, one 
could still be outcome responsible. Miller discusses the illustrative case of making a bonfire 
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in your garden.  If someone makes a fire in their own garden and takes all the measures 54
necessary to prevent the fire from spreading, but the fire nevertheless spreads and burns down 
a neighbour’s shed, the person is still outcome responsible for the shed being burned down. 
Miller argues that considerations such as these play an important role in identifying agents 
who are outcome responsible because “we want people to be able to control what benefits 
and burdens they receive, but we also want to protect them against the side effects, intended 
or unintended, of other people’s actions.”  Hence, fluky results and genuine accidents should 55
be excluded from generating outcome responsibility. In a similar way, Miller clearly separates 
outcome responsibility from moral responsibility.  Whereas outcome responsibility does not 56
necessarily have to entail moral responsibility, one, at least, has to be outcome responsible in 
order to be morally responsible. Using the example of artists and athletes who are able to 
produce great achievements for which they are outcome responsible, Miller argues that it 
would be to much to state that these artist and athletes are also morally responsible for their 
achievements in a way that deserves moral praise. In this way, Miller argues that 
distinguishing outcome from moral responsibility is important as it allows innocent or even 
well-behaving agents to be responsible for an outcome and the compensation thereof without 
morally blaming or appraising them.  57
As previously stated, Miller distinguishes moral responsibility as one of six ways 
remedially responsible agents might be identified. Whereas an agent who is morally 
responsible for a result must also be outcome responsible, an agent does not necessarily have 
to be causally responsible in order to be deemed morally responsible. An obvious example of 
this would be when a child drowns in a swimming pool when the lifeguard, whose job it is to 
oversee the swimming pool, was not paying attention. Here, the lifeguard is not causally 
involved in the drowning of the child. However, due to the fact that it was the lifeguard’s task 
to prevent drownings from occurring, the lifeguard can be said to be morally responsible for 
the drowning of the child. Therefore, in order for an agent to be held morally responsible, the 
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agent’s conduct must display some moral fault.  Such morally faulty behaviour can, among 58
other things, include deliberate or reckless deprivation, acting negligently or failing to fulfil 
an obligation.  By holding an agent remedially responsible for another person’s situation, 59
according to Miller, “we not only create a mechanism for getting [the other person] out of 
that condition but we also help to put right the moral imbalance between [the agent and the 
other person]”.  Depending on the context then, the remedially responsible agent owes the 60
other person an apology, compensation or relief.  
The remaining type of responsibility Miller considers as part of his connection theory 
is causal responsibility. As the earlier example of spilling someone’s drink due to being 
pushed shows, an agent who is causally responsible for a result does not necessarily have to 
be outcome responsible. However, Miller argues that such causal relations can suffice in 
singling out agents who bear remedial responsibility.  Miller concedes that there are bizarre 61
and unpredictable cases in which it would not be reasonable to hold an agent accountable for 
an outcome. He does, however, claim that when other forms of connection are absent in cases 
in which there is a need to assign remedial responsibility in order to bring relief, a causal link 
can be the reason for being assigned with remedial responsibilities. Hence, although a 
causally connected agent might not end up being outcome responsible, the causal link still 
might give rise to remedial responsibility. If we revisit the case of spilling someone else’s 
drink when being pushed over, the causal connection might still cause the causally linked 
agent to incur a responsibility to apologise or help clean up the spilled drink. The same 
counts for cases in which an agent is severely constrained or coerced and thereby inflicts 
harm on another. The mere fact of being constrained or coerced takes away any form of 
moral or outcome responsibility, yet the coerced or constraint agent may still owe the harmed 
person some help or an apology.  All in all, causal involvement does seem to evoke 62
responsibilities in agents on Miller’s account.  
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 Next, Miller discusses three non-backward looking ways in which remedial 
responsibilities might be grounded. The first of these ways is by benefitting. If I buy a 
suspiciously cheap bike of which I later find out that it was stolen from another person, I 
have benefitted from the fact that the original owner has been deprived of their bike. 
Although I am not causally, morally or outcome responsible for the theft, I can be indirectly 
linked to this deprivation. The fact of having benefited from this situation suggests that there 
are strong moral reasons for me to return the bike to the rightful owner or pay the original 
owner a fair price for the bike. That is not to say that I might not ask for the rightful owner to 
offset my expenses, but the mere fact that I have unjustly gained a benefit from a causal 
chain, seems to invoke a remedial responsibility for me to, at least, try to come to a solution 
with the owner. With respect to this, Miller notes that sometimes “beneficiaries, by virtue of 
having been advantaged, are also the people most capable of supplying the remedy without 
incurring significant costs.”  Miller admits that this type of connection, in absence of other 63
connections, does not always lead to a straightforward obligation to return a benefit.  Yet, by 64
benefiting an agent may nevertheless have a strong moral reason to do so. Recently the topic 
of benefiting from injustices has sparked much debate.  However, as Holly Lawford-Smith 65
points out, the difficulty with the concept of benefitting is “in specifying a normative baseline 
relative to which we count others’ acts against [people] as injustices, and count third parties 
who do well out of those injustices as beneficiaries”.  Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to 66
establish with certainty whether a particular positive outcome has solely arisen as the result 
of an injustice.  
 Furthermore, Miller outlines capacity as one of the ways remedial responsibility 
might be identified. Due to the fact that the goal of remedial responsibility is to bring a 
morally unacceptable situation to a halt, it is evident that it should be considered whether an 
agent is also actually capable to provide remedy.  Here, Miller uses the example of a child 67
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drowning in a river. If there are no bystanders other than me, I acquire the responsibility to 
come to the rescue. This is by virtue of the fact that in this case I am the only one capable of 
providing a remedy. In cases in which there are more capable agents, Miller proposes that we 
could for example assign the responsibility with the most capable agent or to each of his or 
her abilities.  Although Miller does not provide a straightforward recipe as to how to balance 68
different degrees of capabilities, he does acknowledges that we should also take into 
consideration the relative costs that come with discharging responsibilities.  If the costs of 69
discharging remedial responsibility are significantly higher for the most capable agent than 
the costs would be for the agent who is a fraction less capable, it might be more justified to 
assign the responsibilities with the somewhat less capable agent. Therefore, Miller admits 
that “judging capacity may involve us in trading off effectiveness against cost in identifying 
the relevant agent.”   70
 The last criterion that Miller discusses is community.  Used in the wide sense of the 71
word, according to Miller, communitarian ties include, but are not limited to, family, 
friendships, collegiality, religion and nationality.  These connections are independent of the 72
other five ways of identifying remedial responsibilities. However, they can of course 
coincide. A close friend or family member might be best positioned (and therefore capable) to 
provide solace for example. As Miller points out, “it is integral to these relationships that they 
involve special obligations”.  73
 When we compare Miller’s framework to Young’s, we can conclude that there are 
multiple similarities. Whereas Young conceived of the role of connections as a separate 
dimension besides privilege and power as one of the applicable dimensions for reasoning 
about responsibility, Miller comprehends connections to be the focus of his framework. On 
Miller’s account, privilege and power can be understood as types of connection. When we 
look at these concepts closely, we can see that where Young talks about privilege, Miller talks 
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about benefit. Young employs the concept of privilege as evoking grounds of political 
responsibility. She argues that “[w]here there are structural injustices, these usually produce 
not only victims of injustice, but persons who acquire relative privileges by virtue of the 
structures.”  How closely related Miller’s conception of benefit and Young conception of 74
privilege exactly are, becomes clear in Young’s discussion of privileges. Young writes:  
 
Persons who benefit relatively from structural inequalities have special moral 
responsibilities to contribute to organized efforts to correct them, not because they are 
to blame for them, but because they have more resources and are able to adapt to 
changed circumstances without suffering serious deprivation.  75
If we consider this piece of Young’s writing through Miller’s terms, it seems that Young’s 
‘special moral responsibilities’ are what Miller would call ‘remedial responsibilities’. What 
Young seems to imply, then, is that without being morally, causally or outcome responsible 
for an injustice, an agent who has benefited might still hold a responsibility to contribute to 
relieving an unjust situation. In this regard, the accounts of Miller and Young seem to 
correspond. Similarly, where Young talks about power, Miller speaks of capacity. Their usage 
of these concepts is relevantly similar. For example, Young’s discussion about the university 
students’ power to put pressure on university boards by demanding to change clothing 
manufacturers, could be phrased in terms of Miller’s capacity. These students are capable of 
pressuring their university by sending letters or by protesting. The corresponding costs of 
these actions would be the students’ time and efforts. Hence, by including conceptions that 
are similar to Young’s concepts of privilege and power, Miller seems to provide an account 
that is overall more detailed concerning what it means to stand in connection to an injustice. 
In this sense, Miller’s framework does not only seem to include the concepts Young’s 
employs, but it even surpasses Young’s account by outlining three connective types of 
responsibility (moral, outcome, and causal) as well as adding an additional dimension of 
community. Moreover, it seems that Miller’s account is more goal oriented than Young’s. 
Although both of their frameworks are directed at ending injustice, Miller’s usage of the 
word ‘remedy’ provides a clear idea of what it is that these kinds of responsibility aim for. In 
contrast, Young’s usage of political responsibility does not seem able to provide the same 
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clarity. Whereas it is obvious that remedial responsibilities absolve only when some sort of 
remedy is provided, it remains rather unclear when political responsibilities are satisfactorily 
discharged. Taking into account the similarities between the frameworks and given the fact 
that Miller provides us with more guidance for reasoning about responsibilities in situations 
where assigning responsibilities is complex, it seems to be the case that Miller’s account is 
more developed than Young’s. 
1.4 Global Labour Injustice and the Connection Theory 
In order to apply Miller’s connection theory to the case of global labour injustice, we need to 
identify potential candidate agents for remedial responsibilities. In Young’s initial discussion 
about claims of responsibility by the anti-sweatshop movement, she identified several agents 
who are involved in the outcomes of sweatshop labour.  In the first place, we can identify 76
the workers who find themselves in morally unacceptable situations. In this case, these 
workers are the victims for whom a remedy is needed. Besides the sweatshop workers, Young 
identifies several agents who are involved in bringing about these outcomes. These parties 
include the people who run the sweatshops (hereafter ‘sweatshop owners’), the corporations 
that are sweatshop clients (‘corporations’), the governments of the countries where the 
sweatshops are located (‘governments’), as well as the end users of the sweatshop products 
(‘consumers’). To this list I want to add the fellow citizens of sweatshop workers (‘fellow 
citizens’) given the fact that one of the dimensions of Miller’s connection theory is 
community. In the next section, I attempt to systematically apply the previously discussed 
considerations surrounding the six dimensions of the connection theory to the case of 
sweatshop labour.  
 First, we can apply Miller’s connection theory to sweatshop owners. As Young has 
pointed out in her structural analysis of the sweatshop phenomenon, sweatshop owners 
operate from a severely constrained economic position. Although sweatshop owners are to a 
large extent causally and outcome responsible for the working conditions in sweatshops, it 
does not seem that they qualify in the right sense as to be morally responsible. Due to the 
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constraints of a race-to-the-bottom market environment, it seems to be the case that the 
working conditions are to some extent imposed on the sweatshops of the sweatshop owners. 
It is costly to improve working conditions when financial margins are low. In order to 
outperform competitors, it seems that concessions have to be made. Sweatshop owners could, 
of course, decide not to operate their sweatshops this way and decide to shut down their 
factory instead. Halting all operations, nevertheless, does not seem to improve the condition 
of the workers who are dependent on the income. However, the appeal to financial constraints 
only goes so far. Some of the conditions that make sweatshops so objectionable have little or 
nothing to do with reducing the costs of operation. For example, any form of sexual, 
psychological or physical abuse cannot be justified by appealing to financial constraints. For 
these types of abuse, it seems that the responsibility falls squarely on the perpetrators. Hence, 
no analysis of remedial responsibility seems needed for these issues. Conventional reasoning 
in terms of fault or liability seems perfectly suitable of identifying responsible agents. 
Nevertheless, issues such as safety, working hours, liveable wages and employment benefits 
do seem to suffer from financial constraints. Thus, it appears that the wrongs of sweatshop 
labour can be subdivided into two groups: abuses on the one hand and exploitative working 
conditions on the other. As argued, whereas the responsibility for abusing employees lies with 
the perpetrators, such a clear assignment of responsibility does not seem to be possible for 
exploitative working conditions. Improving working conditions is costly and could well 
threaten operations given the fact that financial margins are slim. Therefore, it seems that 
sweatshop owners are exempt from moral responsibility for the working conditions that 
suffer from operating from an economically constrained position. Next, when we analyse 
sweatshop owners from the angle of benefit, it is not clear whether we can conclude that 
sweatshop owners benefit from exploitative working conditions. When the sweatshop owners 
and management earn a relatively exorbitant salary, drive expensive cars and live in big 
houses while their sweatshop workers are hardly able to sustain themselves, it would be 
uncontroversial to claim that their relative benefit is unjust. If this would be the case, the 
appeal to economic constraints loses considerable force. However, whether this is the case is 
likely to differ from owner to owner and therefore a general observation about sweatshop 
owners’ benefit is impossible to make. When we consider sweatshop owners’ capacities in 
light of sweatshop injustices, we are partly bound to revisit their economically constrained 
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positions. They do not seem to be financially capable to improve working conditions (that is, 
if they do not benefit unjustly themselves). However, that does not necessarily mean that they 
have zero capacity. After all, sweatshop owners could take political action. They could 
campaign and coordinate with other sweatshops. In this light, it appears that sweatshop 
owners at least have some capacity to change the unjust situation. Nevertheless, it could be 
the case that they refrain from taking such political action out of fear that it will have a 
detrimental effect on their business contracts. In that case, it would appear that this form of 
capacity suffers from constraints as well. Lastly, the dimension of community needs to be 
applied to sweatshop owners. They do seem do have strong communal ties with the victims 
of sweatshop labour: they are supposedly citizens of the same country, but more importantly 
they have a strong connection in the form of collegiality. That leads to the conclusion that 
sweatshop owners are strongly connected by virtue of outcome and causal responsibility as 
well as community. In addition, they do not seem to qualify for being morally responsible for 
exploitative working conditions. Whereas their economic capacity is constrained, sweatshop 
owners might be able to take some political action. It is difficult to determine whether 
sweatshop owners also benefit from exploiting sweatshop workers, but in cases where that is 
obvious, it would be severely unjust.  
Secondly, Young includes a discussion on the role of governments in global labour 
injustice. Governments do not seem to be morally, outcome or causally responsible for these 
injustices in a relevant way, nor do they appear to relatively benefit from it. This bring us to 
the dimension of capacity. Whereas sweatshop owners could to some extent legitimately 
appeal to economic constraints, an analogous line of argument could be employed for 
governments. One could argue that it could be expected of the governments that they pass 
legislation imposing better working environments. However, governments do not want a 
disadvantageous bargaining position in comparison to other countries. If these governments 
utilise their capacity to enforce better labour standards and that would subsequently lead to a 
loss of jobs or investments, they may expectedly make their citizens worse off. It does not 
seem that a diminished socioeconomic position qualifies as a remedy for the sweatshop 
workers. However, such an appeal assumes that the only measures a government could take 
are actions concerning their own legislation and the enforcement thereof. In the same way 
that sweatshop owners could engage in taking political action, governments could for 
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instance engage in diplomacy with other countries or publicly report on the events that occur. 
Therefore, whereas governments might be constrained in their capacity to provide their 
citizens socioeconomic security through legislation, they still have some capacity through 
exercising their political power. Lastly, governments do seem to hold a strong connection by 
virtue of community. This connection is evident and requires no further discussion. 
Therefore, it seems that the application of the connection theory to governments results in a 
strong connection through communal ties as well as some connection through a government’s 
capacity to engage in political action. Some could argue that this is incorrect and that I have 
overlooked an important dimension. This line of argument would amount to stating that 
governments have a strong moral responsibility to protect their citizens’ safety. Hence, when 
citizens suffer from injustices such as sweatshop labour, it seems to count as a sign that 
governments have failed in fulfilling this responsibility. There seems to be some truth to this 
argument; we do generally view governments as responsible for protecting their citizens. 
However, if we revisit the case of the lifeguard who has a responsibility to see to it that no 
swimmers drown, we can see why this argument does not seem to hold. This time, however, 
the case is a little different: there are a great amount of swimmers drowning at the same time 
and the lifeguard on duty is not well-enough equipped with sufficient resources (e.g. rescue 
buoys). In this case, it seems obvious that the lifeguard operates from a constrained position 
and will not be able to save all the swimmers. As long as the lifeguard did everything within 
his or her abilities to fulfil their responsibility, I believe the lifeguard would be not be morally 
responsible for the death of the drowned swimmers. This conclusion corresponds with the 
intuitions we have about doctors. Doctors can be said to have a responsibility to provide 
people with adequate medical care. They do, however, not have a responsibility to keep 
people alive. They should do whatever is in their power to see to it that people are provided 
the help they need, but they cannot guarantee a positive outcome. I believe the same applies 
to governments. Governments should do whatever is in their power to protect their citizens’ 
safety, but they cannot guarantee outcomes. As long as governments do everything within 
their capabilities to avoid negative outcomes, I believe governments would, ceteris paribus, 
not be morally responsible.  
Next, I want to consider the connections between sweatshop workers and their 
compatriots. Although fellow citizens have strong communal ties to sweatshop workers, they 
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do not seem to be strongly connected through the other dimensions of the connection theory. 
Irrespective of strong communal ties, there need to be resources available in order to bring 
remedy. Since it is hard to imagine that someone would voluntarily work in a sweatshop if  
they had other opportunities, the fact that people do work in sweatshops is much telling about 
the extent of resources available within a country and the sacrifices citizens are willing to 
make for their sustenance. Besides some capacity to engage in political action, fellow citizens 
do not seem to be strongly connected by virtue of their capabilities. However, there even 
appear to be constraints regarding the citizens’ capacity to engage in political action. 
Following the collapse of the Rana Plaza, there were several protests demanding that the 
minimum wage of the workers should be raised.  Although wages were raised, they 77
remained very low. A few years later, some workers were fired and new protests demanding a 
higher wage were sparked in Bangladesh. Police deemed the protests to be illegal, fired 
rubber bullets on protestors, arrested workers and union leaders and forced others into hiding. 
In the end, thousands of workers were fired by factory owners. When a worker is fired, it is 
unlikely that they will be able to find new work in the area. Sweatshop owners distribute 
names and photos of fired employees in order to guarantee that. These actions of sweatshop 
owners as well as the police clearly fall in the category of abuse. No appeal to economic 
constraints can legitimately be employed by sweatshop owners to avoid responsibility for 
these abuses. That being said, such stories are a good reflection of the fearful circumstances 
of people’s lives. If this is the way protesters and unionised workers are being treated, it does 
not seem reasonable for citizen to engage in potentially dangerous political action. These 
considerations urge us to look elsewhere for remedial responsible agents.  
Upon consideration, the main connection people from affluent countries seem to have 
with global labour injustices such as sweatshop work, appears to be through their 
consumption choices. Considered together, consumers drive the demand for the products 
produced in such sweatshops. It is extremely probable that an individual from a relatively 
affluent country owns a pair of shoes or a sweater that finds its origin in a sweatshop. Even in 
the highly exceptional situation that this is not the case, it is very likely that these people still 
own some sort of electronic device that can be linked to an electronics sweatshop. It is very 
difficult as well as uncommon for a consumer to have zero connections with sweatshop 
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labour. When we analyse consumers’ connections through the six different dimensions of the 
connection theory, we can discern a strong causal connection. Consumers are causally 
involved by generating demand for sweatshop products. Due to the fact that consumers are 
often unaware of the side effects of their consumption, they do not seem to qualify for having 
strong connections based on moral or outcome responsibility. However, although consumers 
do not intend to produce the unjust outcomes of sweatshop work, it can nevertheless be 
argued that some degree of outcome responsibility resides with them. When we apply a 
standard of reasonable foresight (as Miller instructs us to), one could argue that there is some 
degree of foreseeability to the purchases of consumers. When consumers purchase goods 
from corporations that have been linked to sweatshop labour, there is a foreseeable collective 
outcome to that. Therefore, it seems that consumers have at least some degree of outcome 
responsibility when we consider consumers collectively. In addition, consumers have the 
capacity to, among other things, change their consumption patterns on which their causal 
involvement is based. In addition, consumers could engage in political action. Whereas 
protesting or unionising can come at a considerable cost in countries such as Bangladesh, this 
does not seem to be the case in relatively affluent countries. It is not only safer to take 
political action, it also seems as if the political power of individuals in relatively affluent 
countries is also greater. Due to the fact that corporations attempt to meet the demand that is 
generated by consumers from affluent countries, a political demand for change is likely to be 
met by corporations. Therefore, consumers seem to have a moderate to strong connection 
based on their capacity. Moreover, it is difficult to establish whether consumers benefit from 
the deprived conditions of sweatshop workers. Initially, it seems rather uncontroversial to 
claim that consumers do benefit from the exploitation of sweatshop workers. If these workers 
would be paid more, the production costs would increase and the selling prices of products 
would rise correspondingly. However, the latter does not necessarily have to be the case. We 
can conceive of a situation in which the wages of the sweatshop workers would increase and 
their work environments would be improved without a necessary corresponding change in 
selling prices. Instead, the profit margins of corporations could decline considerably. This 
improves the workers’ positions, yet does not result in a change for the consumer. It is unclear 
whether this is a possible or likely scenario. However, the fact that–in theory–this could be 
the case, makes it complicated to determine whether consumers necessarily benefit from the 
28
exploitation of sweatshop workers. Lastly, consumers do not seem to hold any particular 
communal ties with sweatshop workers. Therefore, when the connection theory is applied to 
consumers, we can conclude that consumers have a strong causal connection as well as a 
moderate connection in terms of outcome responsibility and capacity.  
When we apply the six grounds on which to determine remedial responsibility to the 
case of sweatshop labour, it becomes clear that the corporations that manufacture their 
commerce in sweatshops are the most strongly connected agents to the injustice. With 
‘corporations’, here, I refer to large scale, big brand, multinational corporations. Among these 
are, for instance, famous apparel brands such as Nike and Adidas as well as technology 
corporations such as Apple and Samsung. Multi-billion dollar corporations such as these 
might not be directly causally responsible for the state of affairs in their subcontractor’s 
sweatshops. However, it can be argued that they are morally responsible (which thus includes 
outcome responsibility) for the morally unacceptable condition of the sweatshop workers 
who make their products. These corporations determine the price at which their products are 
sold and they directly place orders with these sweatshops. They must be aware of the 
conditions in their subcontractor’s sweatshops, and if that is not the case, it would be out of 
negligence. The fact that these corporations can decide to outsource their business to other 
manufacturers or to other countries, allows them to have enormous bargaining power on price 
agreements. This way, there is a coercive force to their conduct. This does not only apply to 
price negotiations with manufacturers, but also to tax negotiations with governments. The 
ability of corporations to operate from a position of influence, points towards a high degree 
of moral responsibility for the effects of their conduct. Besides their moral responsibility, 
these corporations are also strongly connected by virtue of benefit and capacity. The financial 
resources of multi-billion dollar corporations and the bargaining power that comes along with 
it, are proof of both having benefited as well as being capable of affecting positive change. 
Instead of making billions in profit, they could alleviate the working conditions of the people 
who make their products. Besides these considerations, a case could also be made for these 
corporations’ communitarian ties. In his wide conception of community, Miller includes the 
notion of collegiality. If collegiality includes all the agents who together produce a 
commercially valuable outcome, then the case could be made that corporations are also 
strongly connected to the morally unacceptable situation of sweatshop workers by virtue of 
29
communitarian ties. All in all, corporations seem to be very strongly connected to the dire 
situation of the sweatshop workers through being morally responsible, having benefitted, 
having capacity as well as having communitarian ties. 
 The application of Miller’s connection theory to the issue of sweatshop labour shows 
that some agents are more strongly connected to the injustice than others. All of the involved 
agent at least seem to be able to engage in political action, although the costs of such actions 
might weigh heavier on some. I believe that the application of Miller’s connection theory 
would conclude that where connections can be discerned between an agent and the injustice, 
these connections evoke a remedial responsibility for the agent to at least engage in political 
action unless that would be excessively costly. However, when we consider the different 
agents and their corresponding connections, I believe the strongest case can be made for 
corporations as principally bearing a remedial responsibility to end the exploitative working 
conditions of sweatshop workers. Decisive in this is that corporations seem to have the 
strongest connection based on their moral responsibility, having benefitted as well as their 
capacity to change matters. Corporations seem to be the most powerful agents: the cost of 
discharging their remedial responsibility would be relatively low and the effectiveness of 
their actions would be relatively high. Hence, it seems uncontroversial to conclude that the 
application of Miller’s connection theory would render corporations that outsource their 
production to sweatshops as primary bearers of remedial responsibility. 
 This, however, seems to be where the problem arises. Corporations are not doing what 
they ought to. This could be due to the fact that corporations also seem to be the ones that 
profit the most from the injustices as they are now. A study conducted by researchers from the 
University of Sheffield concludes that “whilst garment companies have made ambitious 
commitments to pay living wages in their global supply chains they are falling short when it 
comes to meaningful action to implementing these commitments.”  This study included an 78
analysis of 20 global fashion brands and found little evidence that these corporations’ explicit 
commitments are actually translating into improvements in wages.  It was found that many 79
of these brands outsource their living wage commitments to external initiatives, which in turn 
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have different or opaque definitions and approaches to living wage standards.  In addition, 80
although the 20 brands under consideration all had a commitment to observe freedom of 
association rights, these researchers only found weak enforcement of these right in practice.  81
Hence, these researchers raised considerable doubts for the credibility of the ambitious 
commitments made by global fashion brands. These considerations lead to the conclusion 
that it seems unlikely that corporations will fulfil their remedial responsibility in the near 
future. Instead, it seems more likely that corporations will attempt to deflect or outsource 
their responsibility. The objectionable inaction of corporations urges us to look elsewhere for 
a remedy for the morally unacceptable exploitation of sweatshop workers.  
 This raises the question about what should happen in cases in which agents who are 
primarily remedially responsible do not fulfil their obligations. I believe that in these cases 
the remedial responsibility transfers to other agents. The fact that the responsible agents do 
not provide remedy, does not mean that no remedy should be provided. There is still an 
enduring morally unacceptable state of affairs. Elsewhere, Miller has argued that in cases 
“where responsibility for averting a collective harm can be fairly divided, . . . justice can only 
require each agent to perform his or her share.”  According to Miller, this applies to cases in 82
which several agents share a collective duty for a certain outcome. An example that Miller 
discusses concerns a collective duty to conserve fish stocks in an ocean.  This duty is shared 83
by surrounding countries and distributed fairly by implementing fish quotas for each 
particular country. Applied to this case, Miller asks what is required by justice in cases in 
which some countries do not comply to their set fish quotas. Due to the fact that Miller is 
predominantly interested in the question of fairness, he concludes that what is demanded by 
justice does not require an agent to assume more burden than their original share.  According 84
to Miller, even when other countries do not stick to their quotas, what is demanded by justice 
is to fulfil one’s initial share and not any additional leftover burden of the non-compliers. In 
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this case, the responsibility for the degradation of sea life or lower fish stocks in the 
following year resides with the non-complying countries. However, as Miller points out, this 
conclusion seems to contradict some intuitions that we might have considering certain 
situations. Consider a situation in which there are five people drowning and five capable 
rescuers. In this case, what justice demands of each of these rescuers is to rescue one person. 
However, it seems that when four rescuers each rescue one person and the fifth rescuer 
declines to fulfil their obligation, the four willing rescuers should still attempt to rescue the 
last person drowning. According to Miller, this would be correct: the four rescuers should 
attempt to rescue the fifth. Nevertheless, it would not be demanded from them as an 
obligation of justice, but rather as a ‘humanitarian obligation’.  In other words, these four 85
rescuers have already discharged their obligation of justice, which was to each rescue one 
drowning person. By conceiving of obligations of justice in this way, the four rescuers would 
nevertheless still be obligated to rescue the last person and be liable to blame if they would 
refrain from doing so. The one rescuer who declined to help would nevertheless be the 
primary wrongdoer for having failed to fulfil their duty of justice. In addition, this implies 
that even though an agent complies with the demands of justice by perform their share, it still 
seems possible for the compliers to be responsible for harms resulting from the non-
compliance of others. Miller considers the following case: 
 
Daniel is searching for Edward with the intention of killing him. Frances knows of 
Daniel’s intention, but can hide Edward in a place where Daniel will not find him. 
However, she decides not to do so and Edward is killed. In what sense, if any, is 
Frances responsible for Edward’s death? If we were to say that she shares a 
responsibility with Daniel, this would be quite misleading, because it would 
assimilate the case to one in which Daniel and Frances have cooperated to kill 
Edward. It is clear that the primary responsibility for Edward’s death lies entirely with 
Daniel. Frances bears only a secondary responsibility, namely the remedial 
responsibility to avert harm that will otherwise be caused by another agent. She is 
blameable for not discharging it in the absence of excusing or justifying factors.  86
Although this seems to be a case in which there is one agent who is primarily responsible and 
another agent who is remedially responsible, there is no reason that suggests that the same 
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would not apply to cases in which there would be one agent who is primarily remedially 
responsible and another agent who remedially responsible in a more secondary way. In cases 
in which the agent who is primarily remedially responsible fails to discharge this 
responsibility, the agent who is remedially responsible in a more secondary way might be 
said to be obligated to ‘take up the slack’. In line with Miller’s analysis, this would not 
required as a demand of justice, but as part of fulfilling one’s humanitarian obligation. This 
seems to be correct. Remedial responsibility does not start by asking which agent is failing to 
discharge their duties of justice. Rather, its starting point is the existence of a situation of 
which it would be morally unacceptable if it were to persist. 
 When we apply this logic to the case of sweatshop labour and its connected agents, 
we can conclude that although corporations would primarily be remedially responsible, other 
agents seem to acquire more responsibility due to the corporations’ objectionable inaction. If 
my application of Miller’s connection theory is correct, one could argue that an initial 
assignment of remedial responsibility could possibly be as follows: corporations have the 
largest share of remedial responsibility grounded by virtue of their power, having benefitted 
and being morally responsible and the other agents each have a less-significant shared 
remedial responsibility to engage in political action to the best of their abilities. Due to the 
considerations outlined by the connection theory, this seems to be a justifiable distribution of 
remedial responsibility. However, as argued, corporations are not complying; they do not 
seem to discharge their responsibility. Hence, there is a corresponding need to redistribute a 
share of the remedial responsibility. That is not to say, however, that this implies that 
corporations are off the hook. In contrast, corporations are not fulfilling what they ought to 
and the previous considerations suggest that they remain the right target for blame and 
potential claims of compensation. Nonetheless, the question remains where the unfulfilled 
share of the responsibility to provide remedy falls. In my initial discussion of the application 
of Miller’s framework, I have discussed how some agents operate from a constrained 
position. Where some agents’ capacities are limited due to insufficient financial resources, 
other agents might fear that taking action could result in unfavourable outcomes such as 
sweatshop workers losing their only source of income. These concerns, I believe, conclude 
that there are legitimate arguments for why it might not be reasonable to expect these agents 
to assume a larger share of remedial responsibility in absence of the compliance of 
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corporations. As argued before, the capacities of governments, fellow citizens and (non-
benefitting) sweatshop owners suffer from such kinds of constraints. Hence, there are good 
reasons to believe that the costs of discharging an additional share of remedial responsibility 
might be too burdensome for these agents. That is not to say that they should not attempt to 
employ their capacities to the best of their abilities. After all, their original share of remedial 
responsibility already requires them to do so in order for them to discharge their share of 
responsibility. However, their constrained capacities are likely to excuse these agent for not 
taking up a larger share of responsibility when others do not comply. Due to the non-
compliance of corporations and the constraints of other agents, it seems that consumers 
inherit a larger share of remedial responsibility. Although the application showed that 
consumers’ connections to global labour injustice might not be as strong as the connections 
of corporations, their connections are nevertheless significant. Consumers are causally 
involved in sweatshop injustices by driving demand. Moreover, due to the fact that there is 
some reasonable foreseeability to their actions, it would seem that they also hold some 
outcome responsibility. Besides the fact that consumers do not seem to suffer from 
constraints in the same way that other agents do, there also seems to be an intuitive argument 
for why it would be appropriate for consumers to inherit a larger share of remedial 
responsibility. This argument has to do with the fact that corporations aim to provide for the 
demand generated by consumers. When the demand for products plummets because 
consumers do no longer want to buy products made in sweatshops, corporations are likely to 
cater to the consumers’ newly altered demand. In this way, consumers seem to hold some 
power over corporations. Although consumers might be not be able to guarantee that 
sweatshop workers will not be exploited in a direct way, they seem to have some capacity to 
pressure corporations into discharging their responsibilities. Hence, due to the fact that other 
agents are either not discharging their responsibility to provide remedy or seem constrained 
in their capacity to provide remedy, it seems that some additional remedial responsibility is 




Discharging Remedial Responsibility as Consumer 
The application of Miller’s connection theory led to the conclusion that consumers from 
affluent countries incur some remedial responsibility for sweatshop injustice by virtue of 
being connected as consumers. In fact, consumers might bear a greater share of remedial 
responsibility than it may initially seem. Due to the fact that corporations are not fulfilling 
their share of responsibility, there is reason to believe that consumers may inherit some of the 
corporations’ unfulfilled share. Hence, at this point it seems uncontroversial to state that 
consumers have remedial responsibilities towards exploited sweatshop workers. The logical 
subsequent question then becomes: what specific actions are required of consumers in order 
to discharge their remedial responsibility? One possible answer to this question seems to be 
that, since consumers incur their remedial responsibility due to being connected as 
consumers, they should also discharge this responsibility as consumers. According to this 
position, consumers ought to take into account ethical considerations for their purchasing 
decisions and discharge their remedial responsibility by purchasing particular products that 
are deemed morally acceptable and refraining from purchasing products that are not. In other 
words, this positions holds that consumers ought to discharge their remedial responsibility by 
consuming ethically. I believe that there are convincing arguments that could be raised 
against the position that individuals who incur remedial responsibility as consumers should 
also discharge this responsibility as consumers. I do not aim at providing an exhaustive 
account of all possible arguments; I will only present and discuss three of these arguments. 
The discussed arguments pertain to the circumvention of democracy, complexity and 
demandingness, and causal inefficacy. Whereas the latter two arguments prove to be strong 
objections to the position that consumers should also discharge remedial responsibility 
through their consumption choices, the first argument does not seem to be a successful 
objection. However, before these arguments will be discussed, I will first aim to elucidate 
what ethical consumerism would amount to in light of this discussion.  
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2.1 Ethical Consumerism 
In order to establish whether or not individuals should discharge their consumer-incurred 
remedial responsibility by consuming ethically, we first need to determine what consuming 
ethically implies given the context of global labour injustice. In his work on ethical 
consumerism, Waheed Hussain distinguishes between different forms of ethical 
consumerism.  Although I will turn to Hussain’s account on ethical consumerism at a later 87
point in this chapter, his descriptions of the different types of ethical consumerism proves to 
be useful in determining what type of consumerism is relevant in light of discharging 
remedial responsibilities. Among the different types of ethical consumerism, Hussain 
includes ‘clean hands ethical consumerism’. Clean hands ethical consumerism aims at not 
being implicated in immoral practices. A consumer who does not buy fur coats because he or 
she aims at not being implicated in the animal cruelty surrounding fur production would be 
an example of a consumer who wants to have ‘clean hands’. This consumer could refrain 
from purchasing fur without necessarily aiming to change the fur business. Another type of 
ethical consumerism Hussain discusses is ‘expressive ethical consumerism’. This type of 
consumerism aims at expressing certain judgments and attitudes. As an example, Hussain 
pictures a consumer who shops at an organic supermarket with the aim of expressing a 
“disapproval of the broader culture of mass-produced food”.  Moreover, there also exists 88
‘unmediated ethical consumerism’ which does not aim changing practices but at directly 
advancing a goal. Here, Hussain includes the example of driving a hybrid car with the goal of 
emitting less greenhouse gasses. Driving a hybrid car does not necessarily mean that the 
motorist aimed at influencing the way car manufacturers produce cars. The focus of 
Hussain’s account, however, is limited to a different type of ethical consumerism, namely the 
kind of consumerism that aims at changing wider social behaviour and practices. Hussain 
calls this type of consumerism ‘social change ethical consumerism’. According to Hussain, 
social change ethical consumerism is “the practice of choosing to buy certain goods and 
services at least partly on the grounds that doing so will create an economic incentive for 
other agents to act in ways that will advance some moral, social, environmental, or other 
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nonmarket agenda”.  Important to note here is that this type of consumerism can be 89
performed through refraining to buy certain products (“boycotts”) as well as buying products 
and brands that actively promote a certain agenda (“buycotts”).  Consuming in a certain way 90
because one believes it will positively contribute to the goal of reaching global labour justice 
seems to fall under this category; social change ethical consumerism. 
 However, if ethical consumerism is motivated by a need to discharge remedial 
responsibility, it seems that in order for consumerism to count as ethical consumerism, it has 
to succeed in discharging that responsibility. Similar to social change consumerism, 
consumerism that is motivated by remedial responsibilities aims to advance particular goals 
through boycotts and buycotts. Yet, when this ‘remedially-motivated’ ethical consumerism 
does not lead to the desired consequences, it does not seem that remedial responsibility has 
been successfully discharged. Therefore, given the context of remedial responsibility, it 
seems to be the case that remedial responsibilities should successfully be discharged in order 
for this way of consumerism to qualify as ethical consumerism. 
 Taking these considerations into account, it would appear that not every boycott 
would count as an act of ethical consumerism. If it is the case that a connection to global 
labour injustices through the consumption of products leads consumers to incur a remedial 
responsibility to alleviate global labour injustice, one might think that a consumer ought to 
boycott the products that generate this connection in the first place. On the topic of boycotts, 
Young has remarked that not only would individual boycotts be futile, it is also “nearly 
impossible in the contemporary world for a person to remove herself from implication 
through her actions in structures that produce injustice.”  While leaving aside the futility and 91
possible challenges an individual might face for now, it is often claimed that if everyone 
would stop buying sweatshop products, it would help sweatshop workers. However, one 
might raise serious doubts as to whether a boycott will have the desired effects. As Claudia 
Mills points out, “[c]onsumer boycotts may harm low-level employees to a greater extent 
than bosses, who are likely responsible for adopting the objectionable practices in the first 
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place.”  Similarly, some projections show that consumer boycotts concerning child labour 92
could actually have a detrimental effect on a family’s income and increase child labour rather 
than decrease it.  Surely, boycotts that have such unintended negative effects cannot be 93
deemed to be desirable. Similarly, if collective boycotts would succeed and sweatshops were 
to be closed down, it is not at all clear that this leads to an improved situation for the newly 
unemployed sweatshop workers. At least these sweatshops offered some form of income for 
these people. If they would have had better alternatives, it can be assumed that they would 
not choose to be exploited in this way. When these workers have no form of social security or 
other source of income to fall back on, it is not at all obvious that depriving them of their 
sweatshop job would constitute to helping them. This way, it becomes clear that sweatshops 
themselves are not necessarily the problem but more of a symptom of the pervasive 
underlying structural injustice. One-sidedly boycotting certain products with the aim of 
shutting down sweatshops without working to improve the socio-economic position of the 
exploited workers, seems to be making things worse for an already vulnerable group of 
people. Therefore, it appears that not all boycotts will lead to the desired ethical effects. 
Although consumers who participate in such boycotts might be said to have ‘clean hands’, it 
does not seem that in such cases ‘clean hands’ amount to a remedy for an unjust situation. 
Therefore, when boycotts have such unintended or undesired negative effects, it seems that 
remedial responsibilities are not successfully discharged. 
  There exists some disagreement about whether one can harm someone else while 
making that same person better off.  The thought behind this is that because sweatshops 94
workers are able to earn a wage, their situation is better than it would have been without the 
sweatshop’s existence. Therefore, according to this view, these sweatshops are not harming 
but helping them.  For this reason, Lawford-Smith refrains from using the term ‘harm’ and 95
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instead speaks of ‘injustice’ in relation to exploitative working conditions.  Although I see 96
no problem with the alternative term ‘injustice’, I do believe that this discussion is a non-
starter when it comes to sweatshops. I concede that, yes, shutting down sweatshops 
immediately would likely make a lot of people worse-off. However, I do believe one can 
make another better-off while still continuing to harm them. Harm is often understood in 
relation to certain baselines. For example, an intuitive baseline comparison could ask whether 
these workers are worse-off in comparison to before the sweatshop existed? Similarly, 
another baseline comparison could compare the current situation of workers to what their 
situation would have been like had the sweatshop not operated there. However, when I say 
that sweatshop workers are still harmed here, I am not referring to one of these intuitive, 
comparative baselines. Instead, we should consider a normative baseline.  Consider the 97
following case of a cruel kidnapper and a lesser-cruel liberator. Imagine that a cruel 
kidnapper kidnapped a person. In captivity, the kidnapper physically and mentally tortures 
the person several times a day. One day, a lesser-cruel liberator shows up and frees the person 
from the kidnapper. However, the lesser-cruel liberator still keeps the person in captivity. This 
liberator does not torture the person, yet, deprives the person of their freedom. In this 
fictional case, there is no doubt that the liberator makes the person better off. Therefore, 
baselines comparisons that compare a current state of affairs to a state of affairs preceding an 
intervening act as well as those that make a comparison to how it currently would have been 
like had the intervention not taken place, would conclude that the net-benefit of no longer 
being tortured means that the lesser-cruel liberator does not harm the person. However, by 
perpetuating the state of captivity which severely restricts the person’s freedom, does the 
liberator not continue to harm the person? I believe, in this case, the liberator makes the 
person better off while continuing to harm the person. A similar case, I believe, could be 
made in light of sweatshops. Although it might be true that sweatshops make workers better 
off, they also serve to perpetuate injustice and thereby harm the workers by exploiting them. 
Hence, the argument that sweatshops do not harm people because these workers might be 
worse off without them seems objectionable. If we accept that harm is a comparative concept, 
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then we need an appropriate baseline. It seems that if that is the case, a normative baseline 
would sometimes be appropriate. For example, we could have a baseline comparison that 
compares the current situation of sweatshop workers to how their situation would have been 
like under fair terms of cooperation. Alternatively, we could, for instance, compare these 
workers situation to how their situation would have been like if the labour laws of a given 
affluent country had applied in the country of the sweatshop. My aim here is not to provide a 
conclusive baseline to which to compare the harms of sweatshops to. It is merely to argue 
that the exploitative labour conditions of sweatshops can still harm workers even though they 
might also help them in other ways. It seems that in the case of sweatshops, it is problematic 
to aggregate these harms with the benefits.  
  All in all, it seems to be the case that not all boycotts will be ethical. Even when the 
boycotts are executed with the intention of bringing about a good outcome, they can still fall 
short of counting as ethical consumerism. In light of this discussion, it seems that only when 
boycotts succeed in having an effect that would count as discharging one’s share of remedial 
responsibility, it would qualify as ethical consumerism. Therefore, it appears that a consumer 
would only be acting ethically to the extent that they aim at finding out what the effects of  
particular boycotts are and adapt their behaviour accordingly.  
2.2 Circumventing Democracy 
 
The first argument I want to consider against discharging remedial responsibility through 
ethical consumerism has been developed by Hussain.  Hussain aimed at answering the 98
question whether ethical consumerism constitutes an impermissible form of vigilantism. On 
his account, Hussain develops the position that unrestricted social change ethical 
consumerism can undermine what we hold to be important democratic procedural values. 
Therefore, Hussain believes that sometimes such consumerism amounts to impermissible 
vigilantism.  
 Hussain builds his case against an unrestricted authorisation to engage in social 
change ethical consumerism around five core democratic values that are being threatened by 
 . Hussain, “Impermissible Vigilantism?,” 111-43.98
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such engagement.  Firstly, Hussain argues that unrestricted engagement in ‘boycotts and 99
buycutts’ in order to bring about social change “would allow people to use their bargaining 
power in the market in ways that effectively deprive others of their basic freedoms”.  Here, 100
Hussain mentions the example of the consumer boycotts directed at products from Jewish 
merchants prior to the Second World War. Boycotts based on religious beliefs such as is the 
case in this example as well as boycotts based on a disapproval of certain ethnicities, genders, 
sexualities, and other matters that concern freedom of conscience, are at odds with people’s 
fundamental freedoms. Due to his conviction that this should not be possible, Hussain argues 
that this amounts to the first reason to restrict social change ethical consumerism. Another 
reason to oppose unrestricted social change ethical consumerism, according to Hussain, is 
that it is incompatible with the idea of political equality. People should have equal access as 
well as an equal say in matters. In the scenario in which one must ‘vote with their dollars’ in 
order to bring about a desired outcome, the people with the most dollars would also have the 
most say in matters. This would lead to a situations in which the more affluent can apply 
more pressure to cover and advance a certain agenda, Hussain argues. When this logic is 
applied globally, this imbalance lies at the core of the unfair but favourable bargaining 
position of the affluent west in respect to the rest of the world. In addition, Hussain points to 
the public deliberation that precedes matters that concern members of a democracy. A 
democratic political system is built around different parties that deliberate. Matters that are of 
public interest are often also discussed openly in the public debate. If we were to allow 
unrestricted social change ethical consumerism, powerful and affluent conglomerates could 
essentially circumvent such deliberation and compel a particular outcome to their liking by 
making use of their bargaining power. This, Hussain claims, should not be allowed. Next, 
Hussain argues that people should be protected against unjustified uses of coercion. The idea 
is relatively straightforward: if it is not allowed to act a certain way by law, it should also be 
prevented that people impose similar rules on others by making use of their forceful market 
powers. Lastly, Hussain discusses the ideal of managed politicisation. This ideal states that 
“citizens should limit the extent to which they allow their political disagreements to come 
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between them outside of the sphere of formal democratic politics”.  The idea behind this 101
ideal is reminiscent of the common proverbial expression: ‘there is a time and place for 
everything’. In order to preserve the value of democratic processes, it is important not to turn 
everything into a political act. One should be able to do groceries without it having to be an 
assemblage of political statements. If every act is treated like this, it may very well 
desensitise people for political endeavours. These five ways of undermining important 
democratic values are reason for Hussain to propose a restrictive account of ethical 
consumerism instead.  
  On what he calls the ‘proto-legislative account’ of social change consumerism, 
Hussain outlines a few criteria that consumerism needs to abide by to not constitute to an 
impermissible form of vigilantism.  According to Hussain, ethical consumerism is 102
permissible when:  
 
(1) The exercise of bargaining power does not deprive anyone of their basic liberties. 
(2) The exercise of bargaining power is directed at (significantly) advancing an 
agenda framed in terms of a reasonable conception of the common good. 
(3) The formal democratic process has not already addressed the issue in question. 
(4) The process that guides the exercise of bargaining power is appropriately 
representative and deliberative. 
(5) The process that guides the exercise of bargaining power generates standards and 
arguments that can be the basis of future legislation. 
(6) The overall effort aims to raise awareness of the issue and (if necessary) to put it 
on the formal legislative agenda.  103
In this way, Hussain claims, “citizens are authorized to use their market powers to advance a 
social agenda when they treat their buying choices as part of the wider democratic process, a 
kind of ongoing, informal prologue to formal democratic lawmaking.”  Such restriction, 104
Hussain argues, avoids a situation in which consumers from affluent countries could 
effectively impose their demands on the rest of the world by exercising their bargaining 
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powers.  Therefore, Hussain concludes, consumers may only engage in ethical 105
consumerism as long as they do not undermine democratic procedural values.  
 Nevertheless, Hussain concedes that there exist cases in which consumers are not 
required to abide by the restrictions of the proto-legislative account.  Hussain includes the 106
unjust situation of the apartheid as an example in which, in his eyes, South Africans would 
have had a permission to engage in ethical consumerism given the severity of the injustice. 
However, this seems problematic. It is unclear on Hussain’s account what would constitute an 
injustice that is severe enough to not be required to act in accordance with his proto-
legislative account. Would he deem exploitative sweatshop labour as a severe enough global 
labour injustice to not abide by his proposed restrictions on consumerism? Do the harms of 
global climate change or factory farming qualify as exceptions? What seems problematic 
about making exceptions for ‘severe’ injustices, is that it is sufficiently vague enough what 
constitutes a regular injustice as opposed to a ‘severe’ injustice. There is likely to be 
disagreement about where to draw the line as well as about potential borderline cases. Hence, 
in absence of a clear account outlining when such deviations from his proto-legislative 
account are permissible, Hussain’s concession to exceptions seems vague, incomplete and 
problematic.  
 There are, however, other ways in which Hussain’s account can be shown to be 
problematic. Christian Barry and Kate MacDonald have argued at length against Hussain’s 
proposed constructive account.  Whereas Barry and MacDonald discuss several problematic 107
aspects of Hussain’s account, I will only shortly discuss their objections that are relevant in 
light of the discussion of discharging remedial responsibility. Although Barry and MacDonald 
do not deny that there might be cases in which consumer boycotts can be harmful, they argue 
that “the threat that ethical consumerism poses to procedural values has been overstated.”  108
This becomes clear in their discussion of an example from Hussain. Hussain writes:  
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For example, as part of an effort to improve labor standards around the world, 
consumers in the United Kingdom might try to enforce certain labor standards in the 
Philippines by pressuring multinationals that sell goods in the United Kingdom to 
comply with these standards in their Filipino factories. This approach, however, 
would fail to show adequate respect for Filipinos’ views about labor safety and for 
their processes of democratic change.  109
The Philippines indeed have their own labour regulations as well as trade agreements. Thus, 
the issue can be said to have already been addressed. In addition, Hussain would claim that 
such pressure would undermine The Philippines’ autonomous formation of democratic 
decisions. Therefore, this kind of consumerism would not be allowed on Hussain’s account 
due to the fact that, in this case, “consumers fail to show adequate respect for Filipinos’ views 
about labor safety and for their processes of democratic decision-making”.  According to 110
Barry and MacDonald this cannot be right. In this case, consumers aim to exercise market 
influence in order to have corporations adopt more stringent labour standards than currently 
is required by law. Hence, these consumers do not aim to depreciate legislation, rather, they 
aim to ‘raise the bar’. As Barry and MacDonald phrase it: “they are pressuring firms to adopt 
particular practices that fall within the range of those which are legally permissible.”  Given 111
this fact, it does not seem like pressuring corporations to exceed what is minimally required 
is undermining the law in the way that would be relevant for Hussain’s conclusion. Moreover, 
the way that Hussain rules out ethical consumerism for matters that have already been 
democratically addressed also seems problematic. This requirement of Hussain’s account 
seems insufficiently perceptive to the fact that social change is incremental and occurs 
slowly.  In the United States, for example, the abolishment of slavery was followed by the 112
segregative Jim Crow laws. Hence, it can be concluded that the issue had been 
democratically addressed when the Jim Crow laws were in effect. Yet, the issue was far from 
over. Similar cases could be made for women’s rights, environmental laws, or animal rights. 
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It seems that this requirement of Hussain’s proto-legislative account does not take into 
account that legislation can become obsolete and revised over time.  
 Moreover, there is another argument in Barry and MacDonald’s critique of Hussain’s 
account. This argument is based on the observation that many legislative decisions “often 
result from deals cut between powerful interest groups behind closed doors and from 
associated processes of public debate in which normative deliberative standards are grossly 
distorted by the agenda setting and discursive power of corporate interests.”  Corporate 113
lobbying does not necessarily seem to be anomalous to democratic decision making. By 
engaging in ethical consumerism, consumers can employ their power as consumers to exactly 
challenge corporate power and stabilise political inequality in this way. In this way, it seems 
that one could argue that ethical consumerism can influence decision-making processes by 
offering unheard and opposing standpoints than the ones of corporations. In that case, it still 
remains true that those with relatively little money will have little power. However, such 
ethical consumerism might nevertheless aid democratic processes through signalling. Young’s 
analysis showed that some agents appeal to their economic and financial constraints. These 
constraints withhold these agents from taking meaningful action.  For instance, 114
governments fear losing investments and jobs if they were to pass legislation that aims at 
improving working conditions. As Barry and MacDonald point out, “countries that adopt 
them will risk losing out on trade and investment to countries that do not take such actions— 
a process sometimes referred to as ‘regulatory chill.’”  Hence, by signalling willingness to 115
buy more expensive or ethically produced goods, consumers may take away the disincentives 
preventing governments to introduce more stringent legislation.  Surely, when consumers 116
reduce some of the financial hindrances that stand in the way of adopting legislation that is 
democratically desired, it does not seem to be the case that consumers undermine the 
democratic process of another country. Indeed, the opposite seems to be true. Therefore, 
Barry and MacDonald conclude that by Hussain’s account is too restrictive and that 
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consumers engaging in ethical consumerism do not necessarily undermine democratic 
procedural values.  
Despite the fact that Hussain raises some forceful concerns about potential threats of 
boycotts to democratic functioning, his proto-legislative account does not seem to offer 
satisfying reasons for constraining consumers to not discharge remedial responsibility 
through their consumption choices. The goal of remedial responsibility is to alleviate 
injustice in itself. Therefore, it seems that the goal of consumerism that aims to achieve this 
kind of change will not force agents to act in contravention of the law. Rather, it will attempt 
to encourage agents to do more than is minimally required by law. In the case of sweatshop 
labour, this might result in consumers attempting to raise safety standards or wages beyond 
what is minimally required in a given country. Therefore, it does not seem to be the case that 
such consumerism disrespects or undermines foreign democratic regulation. Hence, 
Hussain’s considerations do not present satisfying reasons for why consumer ought not to 
discharge their remedial responsibility through ethical consumerism. 
2.3 Complexity and Demandingness 
 
The second argument I would like to explore revolves around the idea that discharging 
remedial responsibility through ethical consumerism causes a complex and demanding 
situation for consumers.  
 The complexity I refer to is perhaps best illustrated by a very simple example put 
forward by Leonard Read.  In his famous short story I, Pencil, Read described the 117
genealogy of a pencil, an object that is seemingly very simple. It turned out that a lot of 
different things are needed in order to bring a pencil into existence. On the one hand there are 
of course the natural resources that make up for the physical components of the pencil. 
Among the natural components listed by Read are wood, lacquer, graphite, wax, the ferrule, 
factice, pumice and glue.  However, that is not nearly the full story. In order to harvest, 118
transport and process these materials, a lot more antecedents are needed. Saws and other tools 
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are needed for the wood. For saws and other machinery–in turn–ore has to be mined. For 
transporting these resources, trucks and trains are needed, and for those infrastructure has to 
be in place. It is important to not forget that at all these different stages there are people who 
work in different vocations: from lumberjacks who chop down cedar trees to the employees 
who sweep the floor of the sawmill after it has been in operation, and from ship captains who 
bring materials to new harbours to the coffee farmers whose beans lend their taste to the drink 
that powers a lot of the workers throughout the whole supply chain. Read took this 
thoroughly intertwined system of social cooperation as a substantiation for a free and 
unregulated market system while pleading for enduring trust in the workings of the Invisible 
Hand.  Whereas I do not believe that the existence of an intricate system of production as 119
presented in I, Pencil is sufficient reason to assent to Read’s conclusion, I do believe he was 
right about the existence and the complexity of such a global system of social production. 
Even the production of such a small and simple object as a pencil presupposes a great amount 
of industries and, more importantly, assumes many actors as condition for the mere 
production of a pencil.  
  The fact that in consuming goods and services a consumer assumes the great amount 
of other agents who are needed in order to enable the ultimate consumption, is only one side 
of the complexity of the issue. Besides the scope of this group of assumed agents, there is 
also the matter of the visibility of this group. Production processes and supply chains are very 
opaque and incomprehensible from the point of view of the consumer. For example, the 
working conditions of sweatshop workers or the wages of coffee farmers are often remain a 
mystery for the consumer. Finding out about all the potential injustices hidden away in the 
supply chain of a particular product is a very time-consuming, if not impossible task. As a 
means of transparency, certificates and labels aim at uncovering and improving production 
processes and supply chains. One of the most well known labels is the Fairtrade label. In 
order to carry the Fairtrade label, a production process needs to meet certain requirements. 
For example, these requirements include that the producer of the product must pay fair wages 
to farmers and/or workers, provide for decent working conditions and ban forced as well as 
child labour. Such labels make things less complicated for the consumer. The idea, then, is 
that when a product has the Fairtrade logo on it, a consumer has good reason to believe that 
 . Read, “I, Pencil,” 37.119
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the product complies with certain standards. Consequently, it is up to the consumer to for 
instance make the choice whether to buy a Fairtrade banana or a regular banana. This way, it 
seems that labels and certificates take away some of the complexity regarding hidden and 
distant production processes.  
 Although this seems to be true to some extent, labels and certificates also complicate 
the situation in other ways. The challenges that arise from such labelling practices seem to be 
threefold. Firstly, it appears that not all corporations are complying to the standards of their 
labels, commitments or initiatives. For example, earlier I mentioned how Starbucks and 
Nestlé have been linked to child labour despite the fact that these corporations have 
committed to a zero-tolerance policy against child labour.  Similarly, research suggest that 120
there is frequent disparity between the commitments of corporations and the external 
initiatives they outsource their commitments to.  In other words, corporations tend to proof 121
their commitments by pointing towards the external initiatives they are part of as evidence, 
while these external initiatives’ requirements sometimes diverge from the corporations’ 
commitments. Therefore, the first complication with these types of product labelling exists in 
whether corporations are complying with the requirements of these labels, certificates and 
initiatives as well as whether potential labels, certificates and initiatives are actually a good 
measure of these commitments. 
  The second challenge posed by such labelling is similar, yet conceptually different. 
Leaving aside the complications around whether corporations are in accordance with their 
commitments, these labels appear to complicate the situation further due to the fact that they 
are often based on normative assumptions. To take the Fairtrade label as an example: how 
does one decide what constitutes a fair wage and what makes for good enough working 
conditions? For example, a fair wage would be a wage that is enough to make a decent living. 
However, how does one in turn decide what constitutes a decent living? There seem to be 
ample normative and implicit assumptions that precede setting such normative baselines. For 
example, an inquiry into these complications about wages shows that “[o]ne problem with 
many corporate definitions of living wage is that they account for the needs of individual 
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workers, leaving out the needs of workers’ families”.  This shows that sticking to 122
commitments of improving working conditions can potentially be meaningless when the 
normative definitions of matters such as safety and fair wages are distensible to the point that 
deficient compliance counts as satisfactory. In this way, labelling appears to present the 
consumer with a problem. There seems to be widespread disagreements between such 
normative standards. It is not always clear to consumers, for example, which commitments to 
paying a fair wage are dependable and correspond to their own definition of what would be a 
fair wage.  
 Lastly, even if corporations are complying to the requirements of trustworthy labels 
with reasonably set normative targets, there is still the question whether these labels have the 
intended effects. Whereas these labels aim to improve certain aspects of the production 
process, it might be that such labels lead to undesirable outcomes. Such unwanted effects 
could be similar to how boycotting sweatshop products might lead to the closure of 
sweatshops on the one hand, while at the same to making sweatshop workers worse-off by 
taking away their only source of income on the other hand. Theoretical economic projections 
about the effectiveness of a label banning child labour show that such a label could possibly 
have unwanted effects.  A label that bans child labour could, for example, result in a 123
displacement effect.  In this case, the displacement effect would be that adult workers 124
replace child workers in the export sector and, in turn, children would work in the domestic 
sector. This would imply that, although it is now the case that there is no child labour in the 
production process of a labelled product, the label did not achieve what it intended to, which 
was to stop child labour. Moreover, there is also additional intuitive point here. As Kaushik 
Basu and Homa Zarghamee point out, child labour “occurs when the adult earning is not 
sufficient to meet the household's subsistence needs.”  A complete ban on child labour, 125
without at the same time providing adult workers an increased wage, would make a lot of 
people worse-off. In addition, consider the following case about a coffee farmer couple who 
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have a few children.  This family grows a large quantity of coffee beans and is left with the 126
choice whether they should allow the children to work on their farm. They know that when 
they would allow their children to work, they would not receive an ‘anti child labour label’ 
and cannot sell their beans at a premium price. Therefore, they decide to hire a few adult 
workers instead. Although these adult workers cost more than their children would, they can 
now sell their coffee beans at a premium price. However, due to a low demand for child 
labour free coffee beans (either due to the fact consumers are not interested in paying more or 
due to oversupply) this family is only able to sell a third of their coffee beans for the premium 
price. The remaining share is sold at regular market value. Now, whether this poses a 
financial harm to the farmer couple depends on a lot of variables such as cost, prices, and 
quantities. However, one could imagine a situation in which the choice to produce child 
labour free coffee is detrimental to not only the farmers, but also to their children. In this way, 
labelling practices might not always yield the desired results.  
 These considerations intend to show that, although labelling practices aim at 
achieving positive results, their actual effects could be different. They could potentially make 
things worse. When the goal of an individual consumer is to learn about the effects of their 
consumption, labels and certificates can make things more transparent while, at the same 
time, make them more complex. It does not appear that all consumers have to do is buy 
ethically labelled products. This could, for example, result in a situation in which 
“[c]onsumers are purchasing products they believe are made by workers earning a living 
wage, when in reality, low-wages continue to be the status quo across the global garment 
industry.”  Although ethical labels are intended to do away with some of the epistemic 127
burden, it appears that more challenges arise that do not relieve a consumer of their epistemic 
onus.  
 Interestingly, there are nevertheless reasonably trustworthy labels. Whereas the 
previously discussed issues concern ethical labelling practices, there are types of labels that 
do not face the same kind of complexities. For example, it is reasonable for consumers to 
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trust most labels on food.  If a consumer has a severe food allergy for a particular 128
ingredient, it is often reasonable for this allergic consumer to consume the product when that 
ingredient is not listed on the label or on a restaurant’s allergy specification. The logical 
question that arises is why there exists a difference in trustworthiness between food labels 
and ethical labels. I believe the reasons are twofold. Firstly, whereas food labels address 
relatively straightforward issues (‘it either contains nuts or traces thereof, or is does not’), 
ethical labels often include normative assumptions of which there are different 
interpretations. As I have already addressed this complexity, I will turn to the other reason. 
The second reason for why there exist a dissimilarity regarding the trustworthiness of 
different types of labelling practices has to do with enforceability. There are, for instance, a 
lot of food regulations and requirements that products need to meet in order to be allowed to 
be sold. Many countries have established food and consumer product authorities that enforce 
legislation and perform investigations. Restaurants and companies that do not meet certain 
requirements are liable for legal sanctions. The problem with a lot of ethical labels is that 
they often do not arise from legislation. If that were to be the case, the products that would 
not meet these requirements would not be allowed to be sold. What makes a lot of these 
labels ‘ethical’ is that they do more than what is legally required. Therefore, it also appears 
that companies that fail to meet an ethical label’s requirements, will not face legal sanctions. 
More specifically, Corporate Social Responsibility practices, such as ethical labelling, 
certification schemes and ethical initiatives, often work as a substitute for actual legislation. 
Some have claimed that these ethical labelling practices are a way of corporations telling 
states “we can fix these problems by ourselves, without state involvement.”  In this way, 129
Richard Appelbaum has argued that Corporate Social Responsibility “represents a key shift in 
economic governance: from public to private regulation and enforcement.”  When 130
corporations outsource their self-imposed commitments to external initiatives or 
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subcontractors and do not sufficiently see to it that the correct standards are being upheld, 
such private governance is effectively void. If, however, there would be strict legally binding 
regulations and corresponding sanctions, ethical labelling practices could become more 
trustworthy. The question remains, however, if meaningful legislation would exist, whether 
ethical labelling practices would grow to be obsolete to some extent.  
Leaving aside the possible solutions regarding the trustworthiness of ethical labelling 
practices and taking all the previous considerations into account, it appears to be virtually 
impossible to find out about all the intricate moral effects of consumption choices. If–for the 
sake of the argument–one would assume that it is in fact possible, it would be a very time 
consuming effort to analyse all of our the day-to-day consumer products. Among other 
things, that would imply doing research about their corresponding production processes, the 
natural resources or materials from which they are made as well as all the ethical labels, 
initiatives and certificates ascribed to them. Therefore, the problem appears to exist in 
determining which boycotts have which effects. In this regard, one could say that discharging 
remedial responsibility through ethical consumerism would create an overly demanding task 
for consumers. However, its demandingness would not only be limited to the epistemic 
realm; there is also an extent to which ethical consumerism can be financially demanding. 
Products that carry an ethical label tend to be more expensive. Fairtrade coffee is more 
expensive than ‘regular’ coffee and ‘conscious fashion’ is more expensive than fast fashion. 
Specifically how demanding the financial burden of consume ethically is, will vary from 
consumer to consumer as it is dependent on contextual variables such as an individual’s 
income as well the additional costs of available alternatives. Nevertheless, it seems to be 
evident that discharging remedial responsibility through ethical consumerism will be 
demanding, epistemically as well as potentially financially.  
However, the fact that the potential costs for consumers to discharge remedial 
responsibility by consuming ethically are high, does not necessarily amount to an all things 
considered trump that forces us to conclude that consumers cannot reasonably be expected to 
discharge their responsibilities this way. After all, it could be that the seemingly overly 
demanding costs of carrying a particular responsibility are insignificant relative to the harms 
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or injustices inflicted upon others when such responsibilities are not fulfilled.  Whether this 131
is the case will depend on the effects of discharging remedial responsibility in this way. If the 
effects of consuming ethically will be significant, one could conclude that the epistemic as 
well as financial demandingness on the part of a consumer would not outweigh the benefits 
of, for example, the improved working conditions enjoyed by sweatshop workers. If, on the 
other hand, the actual effects of discharging remedial responsibility in this way are negligible, 
one could argue that it amount to an excessively demanding, complex and time-consuming 
burden. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the expected outcomes of discharging remedial 
responsibility through ethical consumerism. 
2.4 Causal Inefficacy 
Suppose that it would be the case that consumers are able to find out about the all actual 
ethical implications of their consumption. In addition, suppose that consumers are also able to 
successfully find ethical alternative products and labels. It seems that even if this were to be 
the case, there still exists a convincing argument for why individuals should not discharge 
their remedial responsibility as consumers. This argument relates to one of the most puzzling 
problems of moral philosophy: the causal inefficacy problem.  In this section, I will first 132
discuss the causal inefficacy problem and apply it to global labour injustices. Then, I will 
take on what I believe to be the strongest objections to the causal inefficacy problem in light 
of the global labour injustice discussion and show why those arguments do not seem to hold.  
  In ‘Do I make a Difference?’, Shelly Kagan attempts to answer the titular question 
and, while he does not use the same terminology, presents a lucid explanation of the causal 
inefficacy problem.  Kagan explains that when a large enough group of people acting 133
together is able to produce an outcome of a certain kind, it might sometimes be the case that 
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action are not morally justifiable if it results in disproportionately small gains, see Robert Goodin, 
“Demandingness as a Virtue,” Journal of Ethics 13, no. 1 (2009): 8-9. 
 . The causal inefficacy problem is sometimes also referred to as ‘the problem of 132
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it does not matter to the overall outcome what an individual does. Therefore, Kagan 
concludes that “if enough people do perform the act the results are bad overall; . . . it remains 
true of each individual agent that it makes no difference to the overall results whether or not 
they perform the act in question.”  In this way, the causal inefficacy problem poses a 134
difficult challenge for consequentialist reasoning. On a consequentialist account, an act’s 
rightness or wrongness is based on the result that the act brings about. When an act 
maximises utility or minimises suffering, consequentialists would deem it to be the morally 
right act. However, in order to judge an act through consequentialist reasoning in this way, at 
least some sort of effect seems to be needed. If an outcome is equal whether or not an 
individual omits a particular act, how does one form a consequentialist verdict about the 
rightness or wrongness of said action? In such cases, it seems that an actual result is 
necessary for the action to be condemned. Therefore, when such a result is absent, it appears 
that a consequentialist account cannot provide a satisfactory moral judgment about the 
rightness or wrongness of an isolated act. As a result, some have argued that it is more helpful 
to adopt a virtue ethical approach.  However, others have raised doubts as to whether the 135
inefficacy problem solely applies to consequentialist moral reasoning. As Julia Nefsky 
phrases it the context of climate change: “if my unnecessary driving or flying makes no 
difference with respect to climate change harms, it's not clear why it counts as vicious, or 
why refraining would be virtuous”.  More importantly, in light of the discussion about 136
discharging remedial responsibility through consumption choices, it remains unclear why 
acting virtuously would count towards discharging responsibility. When the virtuous 
behaviour of a consumer has no discernible effect on the situation of sweatshop workers, it 
does not seem as if any sort of remedy is provided. 
 One of the most well-known discussions of the inefficacy problem concerns emitting 
 . Kagan, “Do I Make a Difference?,” 107. 134
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greenhouse gasses for sheer fun.  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong aims at finding a moral 137
principle that can explain the wrongness of unnecessarily emitting greenhouse gasses. He 
discusses the example of driving a fuel-inefficient car for sheer pleasure. Sinnott-Armstrong 
establishes that there is nothing wrong in itself with emitting greenhouse gasses since the acts 
of boiling water and breathing heavily would then also be culpable on account of emitting 
greenhouse gasses.  Surely, it is not morally wrong in itself to breathe or cook. Sinnott-138
Armstrong therefore aims at finding other relevant reasons for why polluting for sheer fun is 
morally reprehensible. However, due to the fact that one’s decision whether or not to take the 
car out for a drive will not have a significant impact on the results of climate change, it 
becomes hard to see what is wrong in doing so. The greenhouse gasses emitted from such a 
drive will not make a difference when it comes to the harms that global climate change will 
inflict on people or the environment. It is only when a very large group of people emit 
greenhouse gasses in this way that distinguishable differences in impacts can be discerned. 
Ultimately, these considerations lead Sinnott-Armstrong to conclude that there exists no 
prima facie wrong (in a sense relevant to climate change) in driving a gas-guzzling car for 
sheer pleasure.  
  When the problem of inefficacy is applied to matters of global labour injustice, the 
implications are the same. There is nothing prima facie wrong about the act of buying clothes 
in itself. For instance, one could buy clothes from ethical sources or at a second hand store. In 
addition, isolated purchases of clothes do not cause people to work in sweatshops on the 
other side of the globe. Similarly, refraining from doing such a purchase will also not make 
an appreciable difference in the amount of working hours or produced product quantities. 
Hence, whether or not a particular individual consumer decides to buy a piece of clothing, 
there will not be a discernible positive or negative effect to the unjust situations of sweatshop 
workers. The same applies to the consumption of coffee or chocolate. An individual’s 
consumption will not force a child to work more on the fields, in the same way as that an 
individual’s decision to refrain from consuming chocolate or coffee will not result in less 
work for said child. It seems to be the case that an individual’s consumption choices do not 
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make a difference when it comes to the outcome and therefore would also not count towards 
discharging remedial responsibility. At this point it would be good to acknowledge that there 
exists a tension between stating that the remedial responsibility of an individual consumer is 
grounded in the causal connection of their consumption choices to global labour injustice, 
and stating that their discharging actions will prove to be inefficacious. I will turn to this 
objection in the next chapter. Presently, I will discuss some arguments that attempt to refute 
the implications of the causal inefficacy problem. 
  There are a few ways of reacting to the implications posed by the problem of causal 
inefficacy.  One way is to take skeptical route of, among others, Sinnott-Armstrong. He 139
claims that since there is no moral principle that can convincingly condemn driving a gas-
guzzler for fun, it is therefore not morally wrong to partake in such activity.  Instead, 140
Sinnott-Armstrong suggests that environmentalists should pressure governments to take 
action.  Due to the fact that the legislation of governments applies to larger groups of 141
people, such governmental action is able to cause discernible outcomes. This way, Sinnott-
Armstrong’s reasoning could be said to be part of the line of argument that states that it does 
not matter what we do individually in situations where we cannot make a difference. Instead, 
Sinnott-Armstrong suggests that we should consider engaging in other actions such as 
political action. For example, individuals should protest, sign petitions and, above all, vote 
for the correct political parties. 
Besides this sceptical approach, there are other ways of responding to the causal 
inefficacy problem. For instance, one could deny that an individual’s actions do not make a 
difference. Since our current analysis concerns discharging remedial responsibility through 
consumption choices, this way appears to be the only relevant way out of the inefficacy 
problem. In order to claim that we ought to discharge remedial responsibility through our 
consumption choices, it seems necessary to show that our actions can make a difference in 
this respect. If it is the case that our individual actions are not able to cause discernible 
results, it would appear that our individual consumption choices will not count towards 
discharging our remedial responsibility. Thus, in light of our discussion, we need to consider 
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the line of argument that states that the causal inefficacy problem is mistaken in stating that 
individuals are not able to cause a difference. Such objections are centred around the idea 
that, either, individuals have a small chance to make a significant difference, or, that although 
individual actions do not have perceivable results, they do in fact have results (albeit 
infinitesimal). These ideas seem to correspond to commonplace intuitions. After all, as Avram 
Hiller argues in light of climate change, it would be metaphysically untenable to conclude 
that although everyone’s collective driving makes a difference with respect to climate change, 
individual drives have no effect at all.  If that were to be the case, he concludes that “then 142
everyone's driving would have to be some odd emergent entity that is not reducible to 
individual acts of driving”.  Such a conclusion indeed does not seem right. Similarly, it 143
would seem odd to conclude that although everyone’s collective sweatshop produce 
purchases make a difference with respect to sweatshop injustice, an individual’s purchases 
have zero effect.  
 In light of the inefficacy problem, Jonathan Glover has proposed that we ought to 
apply what he calls the Principle of Divisibility.  It states that “in cases where harm is a 144
matter of degree, sub-threshold actions are wrong to the extent that they cause harm, and 
where a hundred acts like mine are necessary to cause a detectable difference I have caused 
1/100 of that detectable harm”.  In other words, single individual contributions to situations 145
in which people collectively cause harm, are wrong to the extent to which they contribute to 
the negative outcome.  In this respect, Glover distinguishes two kinds of thresholds.  On the 146
one hand, there are ‘absolute thresholds’ that have sharp boundaries between two different 
outcomes. For example, voting is an absolute threshold. Contrary to such cases, there are 
‘discrimination thresholds’. These are cases “where a single person's act will push a situation 
slightly further in a certain direction, but where his contribution, although real, may be too 
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small to be detected when its effects are spread through the community”.  An example of a 147
discrimination threshold would be global climate change. Glover states that unlike with 
discrimination thresholds, if an act does not result in an absolute threshold being crossed, the 
acting individual has not contributed to the outcome.  In the case of discrimination 148
thresholds, contributions are wrong to the extent that they contribute. In support of his 
argument, Glover conceives of a case in which 100 bandits steal the food of 100 already 
hungry villagers.  All these villagers have their own individual bowls containing 100 beans. 149
If every single one of the bandits would steal one bowl, each of them would individually do 
discernible harm to one of the villagers by leaving them hungry. However, by stealing one 
bean from every single one of the villagers, the bandits would do no discernible harm to any 
of the villagers. Yet, these villagers are still left to starve. Contrary to the conclusions on the 
accounts of those who reject it, Glover’s Principle of Divisibility would still deem the bandits 
to be responsible for their share of the harm done in the latter case. The indiscernibility of 
sub-threshold actions seems to be irrelevant on Glover’s account. 
  The objection to the inefficacy problem that states that individuals have a small 
chance to make a significant difference concerns absolute thresholds. It revolves around the 
idea that there exist some ‘triggering cases’ that will cause a particular threshold to be crossed 
and thus result in an outcome to come into being.  It seems as if an individual consumer 150
triggers such a threshold by purchasing a product, he or she might actually have brought 
about an outcome. In that case, it could be concluded that an individual’s contribution is able 
to result in a significant impact. In her discussion of thresholds, Lawford-Smith uses the 
example of buying a T-shirt.  When an individual buys the 100th T-shirt of a certain kind at 151
a specific retailer, this individual’s purchase might trigger the retailer to place an order for 
another shipment of these T-shirts at the manufacturer of these T-shirts. In that case, it would 
appear that this individual’s purchase has actually done some harm. At this point, a few things 
can be noted. In the way that Lawford-Smith explains the T-shirt scenario, it seems as if the 
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reordering of T-shirts happens on the basis of an absolute threshold. This characterisation 
implies that when a specific amount of T-shirts has been sold, a new order will be placed or 
more products will be produced. Although the consumer is usually not in the epistemic 
position to know whether their purchase will trigger an outcome, one could argue that a 
consumer can reasonably expect that their purchase could potentially have some effect in this 
way. Therefore one could state that a consumer ought not to risk being responsible for such a 
triggering case.  Buying an item that could possibly trigger significantly more harm would, 152
after all, pose an impermissible risk.  
Some have defended a line of reasoning that appeals to such expected effects. In his 
discussion on the topic, Mark Budolfsen includes, among others, Peter Singer, Alastair 
Norcross, and Kagan to be proponents of such a view.  What these philosopher seem to 153
claim is that although individual acts (i.e. purchases) will not have significant impacts, there 
must be a set of actions that together will have a significant impact. Norcross exemplifies this 
with an example concerning the meat industry:  
 
Suppose that the industry is sensitive to a reduction in demand for chicken equivalent 
to 10,000 people becoming vegetarians. . . . For each group of 10,000 who give up 
chicken, a quarter of a million fewer chickens are bred per year. It appears, then, that 
if you give up eating chicken, you have only a one in ten thousand chance of making 
any difference to the lives of chickens, unless it is certain that fewer than 10,000 
people will ever give up eating chicken, in which case you have no chance.  154
As a result, Norcross concludes that an individual’s chance to make a difference is small, but 
not negligible, as it is a chance to make a big difference. Subsequently, Norcross derives that 
a “one in ten thousand chance of saving 250,000 chickens per year from excruciating lives is 
morally and mathematically equivalent to the certainty of saving 25 chickens per year.”   155
However, according to Budolfsen this cannot be correct. The problem with this type of 
reasoning seems to be that it mistakenly equates “the expected effect of that individual’s 
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action—in this case, purchasing one chicken— . . . to the average effect of all actual acts of 
that type”.  In other words, such reasoning claims that because an X number of acts will 156
have a particular outcome, we can divide that outcome by X to end up with the expected 
effect of an individual act. This seems to be incorrect. In fact, the expected effect is very 
likely to be a lot smaller than the average effect. In order for the effect to make a difference in 
this way, one’s contribution has to be the exact triggering case. For every other case than the 
exact 10,000th case, it remains true that that specific act would not have mattered in terms of 
making a difference. This is true for cases in which the 10,000 mark is surpassed as well as 
for the group of cases that together fall short of 10,000. It appears that for an act to make a 
difference, the total group of acts has to exactly cross the threshold and not surpass it beyond 
the triggering case. Although, as Budolfsen rightly points out, the chances of this happening 
is indeed not zero. However, the chance that your act will be the triggering case is 
significantly small enough as to make it severely improbable.  
 In addition, Budolfsen points to the fact that we know enough about supply chains to 
conclude that threshold effects “are not sufficiently likely”.  This point relates to the 157
observation that supply chains (for example, for meat or clothes) are not sensitive to single 
purchases. For example, the sale of pieces of clothing from ‘previous’ collections as well as  
meat that is about to turn bad against bottom prices seems to be proof of overproduction. 
Although it might be true that some producers are able to perfectly tailor supply to consumer 
demand, it is not clear that this applies to sweatshop products. Products that are made in 
sweatshops are typically produced in very large quantities. It seems dubious to conclude that 
reorders for sweatshop products are sensitive to differences of a single purchase. However, 
when we in fact assume that a single purchase can make a difference with respect to causing 
an extra shipment to be reordered, it is still controversial to claim that this purchase will 
result in more sweatshop labour. Even in the near-impossible case that a particular 
individual’s decision to refrain from purchasing a shirt, causes a specific type of t-shirt not to 
be reordered, it still remains far from clear that this will then also result in less work for a 
sweatshop worker. It seems more likely that–if not this particular T-shirt–other shirts, brands, 
or products will be produced by these workers. Hence, we need to sharply distinguish the 
 . Budolfsen, “The inefficacy objection,” 1715. 156
 . Budolfsen, “The inefficacy objection,” 1717.157
60
demand for a particular sweatshop product from the demand for sweatshop products in 
general. If the demand for a particular sweatshop product does not seem sensitive to 
individual purchases, the impact of a single purchase on the total demand for sweatshop 
products would certainly be negligible. Importantly, this is why the inefficacy problem poses 
such a problem for the matter at hand. In order for the argument that states that consumers 
ought not to risk triggering a harmful outcome to work, this risk needs to be non-negligible. 
However, in light of global labour injustices such as sweatshop work, consumers have 
legitimate reasons to expect that their own individual purchase will not result in exactly 
triggering a threshold. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that in the highly unlikely situation 
that an individual’s purchase does trigger such a threshold, it would also result in a 
corresponding a difference regarding the situation of sweatshop workers. Thus, consumers 
have legitimate reason to expect that the effects of their purchase will be negligible. Hence, it 
also does not seem that by purchasing an individual product a consumer risks anything 
impermissible by disregarding the implausible chance that it will make a difference. 
 However, some might argue that the characterisation of sweatshop harm on the basis 
of an absolute threshold is mistaken, inaccurate or unhelpful. Instead, it might be argued that 
we ought to conceive of the situation through a discrimination threshold. This would imply 
that an individual’s actions do not have a chance to make a considerable impact, but that an 
individual’s actions always makes a tiny difference. In this light, an individual’s purchase of a 
shirt that was produced in a sweatshop will not result in a perceivable difference, but it makes 
the situation worse. On this view, an individual’s purchase makes the situation worse both by 
increasing demand as well as by generating additional revenue for the corporations behind 
these products. In this light, Nefsky argues that in imperceptible difference cases the 
difference of an individual’s contribution is a difference along the “underlying dimension”.  158
In the case of individual purchases, the underlying dimension seems to be the collective 
consumer demand. Ultimately, the aggregate of contributions to the underlying dimension 
will determine the amount of harm that result from it. An example of this would be the 
emission of greenhouse gasses. The total aggregate of greenhouse gas emissions will 
eventually determine the severity of climate change related harms. However, as Nefsky 
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argues, it would be mistaken to conclude that the difference an individual makes “along the 
underlying dimension is itself a difference in harm”.  When we apply this to the case of 159
purchasing a shirt, it does not mean that the barely perceptible difference that a single 
purchase makes in terms of demand or revenue, also has a corresponding increase in the 
resulting net amount of harm of sweatshops. Hence, an appeal to imperceptible differences is 
not a satisfactory answer to the causal inefficacy problem. However, there also seems to be a 
relevant intuitive point to why an appeal to imperceptible differences is uncalled for in light 
of the discussion of discharging remedial responsibility through consumer choices. Even if 
we grant that consumption choices do result in tiny imperceptible differences, these 
differences are still imperceptible. It does not seem to be right to conclude that when an effect 
is imperceptible, it still qualifies as being a remedy. Therefore, it appears that when the goal 
of an individual consumer is to exercise their purchasing power in order to discharge their 
remedial responsibility, their actions will be ineffective in terms of relevantly impacting the 
total consumer demand or reducing potential harms. Although it might be the case that in 
other discussions concerning the inefficacy problem, it can be successfully avoided, it seems 
that the inefficacy problem poses an undeniable challenge when it comes to discharging 
remedial responsibility through consumption choices. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks   
In this chapter, I have entertained the question whether remedial responsibility incurred by 
consumers is also best discharged as consumers through their ethical consumption choices. 
Together, these few objections that I have discussed, aimed to show that there are various 
reasons to believe that we ought not to discharge remedial responsibilities through 
consumption choices in an effort to work towards improving unjust labour situations globally. 
Whereas the arguments regarding complexity and demandingness as well as the causal 
inefficacy problem proved to be forceful arguments against discharging remedial 
responsibilities in this way, Barry and MacDonald have shown that the concerns regarding 
the circumvention of democratic processes can be sufficiently addressed. Since Hussain’s 
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62
account could satisfactorily be dealt with, it appears that the answer must be derived from the 
former two lines of argument. In the discussion on demandingness, I established that 
discharging remedial responsibility through ethical consumerism would amount to an 
epistemically as well as financially burdensome task. In response to this, I argued that 
whether or not this burden can be said to be excessive will partly be dependent on the 
magnitude of the effects of ethical consumerism. The subsequent discussion on causal 
inefficacy showed that an individual’s consumption choices will not result in a significant 
impact on consumer demand. Given this conclusion, an individual who aims to positively 
affect the unjust situation of exploited sweatshop workers through their individual 
consumption choices will turn out to be ineffective. Even in the highly unlikely situation that 
an individual’s action does result in an impact, this impact will be infinitesimally small. 
Hence, when we reconcile these two observations, we can conclude that the demandingness 
of ethical consumerism is disproportionally burdensome when an individual consumer is 
anticipating to have an appreciable effect on the unjust situation of sweatshop workers by 
(refraining from) driving demand. 
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Chapter 3 
Successfully Discharging Remedial Responsibility 
In the previous chapter I have discussed multiple objections to the claim that consumers 
ought to discharge remedial responsibility for global labour injustices as consumers through 
their consumption choices. It appeared that discharging responsibilities in this way would 
amount to an excessively demanding and inefficacious task. These considerations led to the 
conclusion that it is highly improbable for consumers to have a meaningful impact on 
consumer demand by discharging remedial responsibility through consumption choices. 
Therefore, it seems that consumers who take this course of action do not successfully 
discharge their remedial responsibilities. As a consequence, the question of how individuals 
should discharge their remedial responsibility remains unanswered. This chapter attempts to 
propose as well as discuss some potentially successful ways of discharging remedial 
responsibility. Upon consideration, it appears that an individual’s attempts at affecting 
outcomes often will be mediated. I will first discuss some of the more intuitive ways of 
mediated political action. Then, I will turn to discussing discharging responsibilities through 
other mediated political acts.  
3.1 Political Action 
In the previous chapter I discussed how Sinnott-Armstrong’s inability to find a moral 
principle that could satisfactorily condemn individual gas-guzzling drives compelled him to 
be skeptical regarding the wrongness of individual contributions.  As a result of his 160
skepticism, Sinnott Armstrong concluded that an individual should instead focus on engaging 
in political actions. For example, if such political actions effectively cause legislation to be 
passed, the coercive power of governments could ensure significant results. No individual 
alone would be able to achieve a positive impact of the magnitude of a state acting in 
correspondence could. There are, of course, different ways to partake in political action. 
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However, it seems that when we think about political acts, we think about acts that are 
mediated in one way or another. When we vote, our political act is mediated through 
elections. When we sign a petition or join a protest, the petition or protest function as the 
medium through which we act. Here, when I refer to political acts, I follow Young’s use 
‘political’. Young’s use of ‘political’ was meant to indicate something broader than politics in 
a governmental sense.  More specifically, she intended to refer to the kinds of activities “in 161
which people organize collectively to regulate or transform some aspect of their shared social 
conditions, along with the communicative activities in which they try to persuade one another 
to join such collective action or decide what direction they wish to take it.”  When we 162
conceive of political acts in this way, there are, on the one hand, more intuitively mediated 
ways that advance a political goal. For example, I mentioned voting, signing a petition and 
joining a protest. Moreover, there also exist less intuitive ways of political actions. Such latter 
efforts aim at achieving an outcome by contributing to endeavours that will in turn be able to 
produce desired outcomes. Before I will expand on these less intuitive ways, I will first 
discuss some more conventional ways of political action.  
 Most of the conventional political actions seem to advance a political goal in a 
somewhat direct and obvious sense. When we vote, join a protest, take part in political 
campaigning, or sign a petition, we aim contribute to a collective effort to affect an outcome. 
These different political acts are mediated but serve their purpose is a relatively 
straightforward way. An individual joins a protest to show that they support and value a goal 
and wish that a particular goal were to be realised. Similarly, an individual signs a petition in 
the hope the petition’s goal will be achieved. For example, an individual can sign a petition 
urging a fashion corporation to pay their sweatshop workers a living wage. In addition, 
although it might seem mundane, personally persuading other people to contribute to some 
end can also be as a way to advance a political goal. More often than not, such political 
action will occur in interpersonal relationships between family members and friends. Given 
the proximity of such relationships, it also seems that these people might be the ones easiest 
to influence in terms of raising awareness, changing their views, or even persuading them to 
contribute to a political cause. However, an individual can also attempt to convince other 
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types of agents such as corporations and institutions. While an individual might not be able to 
convince enough other persons in order for this individual’s actions to result in an appreciable 
effect, an individual might nevertheless be able to persuade an institution or corporation to 
change its course. Again, we can use a university student as an example. This university 
student finds out that the coffee being served in the university’s canteens as well as through 
the university’s coffee machines is brewed with coffee beans originating from the coffee 
farms of exploited farmers. Instead of boycotting the university’s coffee and convincing as 
many peers to act accordingly, this student could write a letter to the university board or the 
relevant facility department. Although the content of such letter will likely differ from person 
to person, it could be effective to address the university’s responsibility as an institute that is 
meant to set an example for society as well as the university’s role in facilitating progress. 
Now, it might very well be that a single letter will not cause the university to switch coffee 
beans. However, if this student manages to convince a few peer students to send a similar 
letter and additionally also convince some of their friends, it might be efficacious. Typically, 
universities are very concerned with their reputation since they want to attract students as 
well as scholars. If, as a result of some letters being sent the school changes to ethical coffee 
beans, an individual may very well have caused an appreciable impact. Given the fact that 
most universities host tens of thousands people (students, scholars, staff, et cetera), the 
resulting amount of ‘ethical’ coffees being consumed instead can be considerable. It could 
even be the case that when a university changes its coffee bean policy and it is published in 
the news, other universities, schools and institutes follow suit. However, obviously not all 
political acts will have such effects. A barista who convinces their boss to switch to ethical 
coffee beans or biodegradable cups, might not cause such a ripple effect. Nevertheless, 
convincing other agents who occupy positions that allow them to produce an outcome that 
extends beyond their own individual contributions, may be a way in which even individuals 
can cause significant impacts.  
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3.2 Collectivisation 
Besides these intuitive ways of attempting to achieve a political goal, there is another way of 
thinking about political action. This way concerns collectivisation. In her recent work 
discussing the complexities surrounding group duties, Stephanie Collins considers 
collectivisation duties to play a central role in situations in which uncoordinated individual 
actions are not able to produce a desired outcome.  In order to understand when and how 163
collectivisation duties are applicable, more needs to be said about the relationship between 
groups and duties itself.  
  In her book, Collins puts forward and defends her ‘Tripartite Model’ of group duties. 
This model is based on the idea that there exist different kinds of groups with different kinds 
of properties. Collins distinguishes 3 types of groups: combinations, coalitions and 
collectives.  Firstly, combinations are random groups of people who, for instance, happen to 164
be at the same place at a given point in time, happen to witness a crime or are on the same 
bus together. Coalitions, in turn, are different from combinations in that the agents that make 
up this kind of group, share the same goal. Examples of coalitions are ‘conservatives’, ‘the 
international community’ or ‘environmentalists’. Lastly, collectives are different than the two 
aforementioned groups in that collectives are united under a rationally operated group-level 
decision making procedure that can attend to moral considerations. As an example of a 
collective, Collins names the United Kingdom.   165
  With respect to collectives, Collins outlines three necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions that groups have to meet in order to be a collective. Firstly, “each member is 
committed (even if only tacitly) to abide by the the procedure’s results.”  This could, for 166
instance, be in terms of being subject to laws or policies by virtue of being a member of 
collective. Secondly, inputs (i.e. beliefs and preferences) and the way of processing these 
inputs are systematically derived from the behaviour of members (by, for example, deference, 
votes or contributions). In addition, these inputs and the way of processing these inputs must 
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also be different from the way that individual members make decisions for themselves. 
Collins exemplifies this through an example about a collective deciding what to eat.  Each 167
member might have their own personal preference as well as way of deciding what type of 
food they prefer for themselves. However, the collective might settle on a completely 
different outcome than any individual would have preferred for themselves and in a way that 
is distinct from any individual’s decision method, namely by conversation-based consensus 
or voting.  Lastly, in order for a group to be a collective, “the enactment of the group’s 168
decisions requires actions on the part of the members, where those actions are also properly 
understood as attributable to the collective.”  For this last requirement Collins uses the 169
example of teaching a particular curriculum in schools.  The execution of this decision 170
requires particular actions on the part of, among others, teachers, school executives, and 
students. These agents are certainly responsible for their undertakings regarding the 
enactment of the collective’s decision to introduce a new curriculum. However, to some 
extent these action can also be partially attributed to the collective itself. When these three 
conditions are met, the group constitutes a collective and the individual agents united under 
these conditions form the collective’s members.  
  In order to bear duties as a group, Collins argues that groups have to be of the latter 
kind, namely they have to be a collective.  This is mainly due to the fact that Collins’s 171
account functions on an ‘ought-implies-can’ basis. When a group is unable to process and act 
on moral considerations, it seems that such a group cannot bear a duty as a group and 
therefore it would be incorrect to state that they ought to fulfil such a duty. In other words, we 
cannot attribute duties to groups that fall short of being a moral agent.  This condition is 172
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sometimes being referred to as the ‘agency requirement’.  Due to the fact that collectives 173
are united under a rationally operated, group-level decision making procedure, they seem to 
exhibit a necessary form of agency in a way that combinations and coalitions do not. As a 
consequence, Collins concludes that because combinations and coalitions lack this feature, 
they cannot bear group-level duties.  However, that does not entail that members of 174
combinations and coalitions do not have any duties at all, but that these duties are held 
individually instead of on a group level. Therefore, on Collins’s view, a duty that is attributed 
to a non-collective group should be understood as “a conjunction of duties, each of which is 
held by one [member], each of which is a duty for that [member] to take steps”.  For 175
instance, members of combinations and coalitions can have duties to act responsively to the 
other members with a view to producing a morally desired outcome. Similarly, members of 
these groups can hold collectivisation duties, which obligate members to perform actions 
“with a view to the formation of a new collective, as well as . . . the maintenance or 
transformation of existing collectives.”  Collectivising, then, is different from acting 176
responsively in that when collectivising happens successfully, a collective ‘takes over’ the 
production of the outcome.  Respectively, when acting with the goal of responsiveness, 177
responsiveness duties exist until the desired outcome is produced. When acting with the goal 
of collectivisation, the collectivisation duties apply until a capable collective exists.  178
According to Collins, responsiveness duties and collectivisation duties are two species of 
what she calls coordination duties. She proposes a 7 step conditional ‘Coordination Principle’ 
that formulates the idea that “if a non-collective group is able to produce a morally valuable 
outcome in a morally valuable way–or is able (in a morally valuable way) to form a 
collective that will produce that morally valuable outcome–and if no other group will do so in 
 . For a discussion on the agency requirement, see Gunnar Björnsson, “Collective 173
Responsibility and Collective Obligations Without Collective Moral Agents,” in The Routledge 
Handbook Of Collective Responsibility, ed. Saba Bazargan-Forward and Deborah Tollefsen (New 
York: Routledge, 2020), 127-41. 
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a better way, then each member has a duty to be responsive to the others with a view to the 
outcome being produced or to the collective being formed.”  On Collins’s account, it can 179
never occur that the coordination principle “produces duties both to be responsive with a 
view to the outcome and to be responsive with a view to forming a relevant collective.”   180
 When Collins’s Tripartite Model is applied to the group ‘consumers’, we can conclude 
that ‘consumers’ do not constitute a collective. From that conclusion, we can derive that the 
group ‘consumers’ cannot bear group level duties. Due to the fact that consumers are to a 
great extent unorganised as well as random, it seems that the group ‘consumers’ would fall in 
the category of combinations. Perhaps some subclasses of consumers (e.g. ‘vegan consumers’ 
or ‘conscious consumers’) might be classified as being coalitions for sharing a common goal. 
At this point, it might be objected that I have made a mistake. If it is the case that consumers 
are not a collective, how might they be said to bear remedial responsibility for global labour 
injustices? My application of Miller’s connection theory considered consumers as a group 
and rendered them remedially responsible for global labour injustice partly on the basis of 
causal responsibility. As the discussion about causal inefficacy in the previous chapter 
showed, no individual consumer causes ‘sweatshop work’. Therefore, it could be objected 
that individual consumers do not score as high as I claimed on the six dimensions of the 
connection theory. After all, there exists a tension between claiming that individual 
consumers are sufficiently causally efficacious as to make them remedially responsible, but 
not sufficiently causally efficacious when it comes to discharging remedial responsibility 
through driving demand. Although there is considerable force behind this argument, I do not 
believe it succeeds in absolving individual consumers of their remedial responsibility. 
Consumers considered in isolation might be said to have a significantly weaker connection 
with regard to causal responsibility, as no consumer alone is sufficiently causally responsible 
for global labour injustice. Hence, one could object while the group ‘consumers’ has a 
considerable causal connection that gives rise to remedial responsibilities, individual 
consumers do not have such a connection. In the previous chapter, I discussed a similar 
observation Hiller makes with respect to responsibility in light of global climate change. He 
argued that such reasoning implies that the collective behaviour of consumers would not be 
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reducible to individual contributions.  In this light, it would be odd to conclude that 181
consumers have no connection at all.  On the contrary, individual consumers even seem to 182
have a very tangible connection. For example, a consumer’s sweatshop t-shirt still finds its 
origin in a sweatshop just as their ‘unethical’ coffee beans once still passed the hands of an 
exploited farmer. I believe that such a (tangible) causal connection is not negligible in the 
same way as the results of attempting to discharge remedial responsibility by directly driving 
demand are. After all, whereas the former connection resulted in the consumption of an actual 
‘unethically produced’ product, the impacts of the latter are not as easily discerned. In my 
discussion, I have attempted to disconnect the way consumers incur remedial responsibilities 
from how they should discharge their responsibilities. Although on the one hand I deem a 
consumer’s connection to be sufficiently morally significant for them to incur remedial 
responsibilities, it does not necessarily follow that, on the other hand, discharging remedial 
responsibilities in the same way as they were incurred in the first place, has the same moral 
significance. In the first case what we are concerned with is a matter of connection, whereas 
in the latter we are concerned with remedy. Those are two distinct matters.  
  Moreover, I believe this objection also fails to take into account the purpose of 
ascribing remedial responsibility. Remedial responsibility’s outset is a state of affairs of 
which it would be morally unacceptable if it were to persist. Although backwards-looking 
considerations are relevant in ascribing remedial responsibilities on Miller’s account, its 
approach is deeply forward-looking. As Young pointed out, thinking along the lines of fault 
and liability when attributing responsibilities only goes so far. We attribute remedial 
responsibility in situations in which conventional reasoning about responsibility proves to be 
insufficient or inadequate. In his discussion on forward-looking character of remedial 
responsibilities, Miller clearly distinguishes between identifying responsible agents and 
assigning remedial responsibility to capable agents. The application of the connection theory 
showed that corporations are most strongly connected, but are not fulfilling their 
responsibilities. Precisely due to the corporations’ sensitivity to consumer demand, 
consumers seem to be best placed in this respect (i.e. most capable) to influence corporations 
 . Hiller, “Climate Change,” 354. 181
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in a way that makes them discharge their justified share of remedial responsibility. Given this 
fact, there seems to be a strong reason for why it would be justified to assign remedial 
responsibilities with consumers. A limited focus on the dimension of causal responsibility 
would therefore be misplaced. Hence, not only does there exist a difference in incurring 
responsibilities and subsequently discharging responsibilities in a way that provides remedy, 
this line of argument also seems to neglect the forward-looking, remedy-providing goal of 
assigning remedial responsibilities.   
Although non-collective groups cannot bear group-level duties on Collins’s account, 
members of such groups can nevertheless have individually held duties to act in accordance 
with other members. As mentioned before, Collins discerns two types of coordination duties: 
responsiveness duties and collectivisation duties. Whereas both of these duties aim at 
producing an outcome that no individual is able to produce alone, they differ in the way they 
function. The underlying idea seems to be straight-forward: it is not always necessary for a 
non-collective group to collectivise in order to bring about the desired outcome. Throughout 
her book, Collins employs the example of a beach rescue. There might be a situation in which 
no single beachgoer is capable to save a drowning person, yet if a group of beachgoers 
cooperated together, they are able to save the person.  For such a rescue it is not always 183
necessary to form a collective and rig up a rational decision making process.  For example, 184
one reason for acting responsively instead of collectivising could be that the latter might be 
more time-consuming.  In light of my discussion of global labour injustice, the question 185
arises whether Collins’s Tripartite Model conclude that consumers bear responsiveness duties 
or collectivisation duties. I believe a strong case can be made for the latter. One 
straightforward reason for in favour of collectivisation duties is that acting responsively to 
enough other agents is virtually impossible. How would a consumer in, for example, Norway 
act responsively to an unknown, far-away consumer in The Netherlands? In addition, there is 
much to be said about the complexity of the situation. There are many different agents and 
parties involved, all dealing with a plethora of national as well as international legislature. 
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There are a lot of interests that need to be considered and weighed in order to ameliorate 
injustice that occurs on a global level. The added benefit of collectivising, is that–unlike 
combinations and coalitions–collectives are able “to produce multilateralism (coordinated 
role-performance) amongst members”.  The need for multilateralism in order to come to a 186
solution for complex and unjust state of affairs as well as the dispersion of consumers amount 
to a big hindrance for potential responsiveness duties. Hence, it seems that if we follow 
Collins’s account, consumers ought to collectivise in order to enable multilateral cooperation 
so as to see to it that a morally valuable outcome is produced.  
 As mentioned before, Collins considers collectivisation duties to be discharged by 
actions that are performed with a view to the formation of a new collective as well as by 
actions that aim to transform and maintain existing ones. Naturally, these acts will differ 
based on the goal they aim to achieve. Yet, they might overlap in some ways. I will first turn 
to acts that are performed with a view to the formation of a new collective. As the discussion 
on causal inefficacy shows, one of the biggest obstacles for people to act in accordance to 
each other in a way that is morally favourable, is the belief that individual contributions are 
negligible taking in isolation. For example, individual consumers might very well feel 
hopeless as well as skeptical with regard to the impact of their consumption choices given the 
fact that a large number of people is likely to continue to consume particular unethically 
produced products anyway. Although an individual might very well want to change their own 
consumption patterns, they regard doing so as futile if others are not willing to follow suit. 
Hence, Lawford-Smith argues that as a first step towards collectivisation individuals “ought, 
at the very least, not to allow [themselves] to be a reason for others to believe that no one is 
willing to get together and act.”  According to Lawford-Smith, an individual thus ought to 187
signal their willingness to cooperate with others.  As Lawford-Smith phrases it, such a 188
“signal prevents others from believing that their own cooperative actions would be futile, and 
sends the message that collective action is possible.”  Further, she distinguishes between 189
 . Collins, Group Duties, 154.  186
 . Lawford-Smith, “Unethical Consumption,” 322. 187
 . Lawford-Smith, “Unethical Consumption,” 322. 188
 . Lawford-Smith, “Unethical Consumption,” 322. 189
73
signalling conditional and unconditional willingness.  When no collective exists as of yet, 190
Lawford-Smith claims that signalling conditional willingness (‘I do if you do’) is the first 
step towards collectivisation. In situations in which such collectives are already established, 
signalling unconditional willingness can be viewed as a commitment to solidarity or 
identification with a particular cause.  Among the examples of potential signals, Lawford-191
Smith includes wearing T-shirts with a particular message, asking questions in restaurants, 
petitioning, protesting as well as sharing content on social media.  Such signals “serve the 192
purpose of lessening perceived support for a social norm.”  Individuals who send out 193
signals can expect their signals to have some effect on other individuals who encounter them. 
In this way, many of our actions are normative. They send signals about what we deem to be 
right as well as undesirable behaviour. Hence, when support for a social norm diminishes, 
there may come a point at which some types of behaviour become frowned upon and 
eventually even morally unacceptable. There is an abundance of examples of this, ranging 
from racial segregation to women’s rights and from smoking indoors to wearing seatbelts. 
Nevertheless, Lawford-Smith concedes that not all signals will be effective. In order to be 
perceived as a reliable and credible signal, the signal must be hard to fake.  More 194
specifically, a signal must come at some cost.  
  Now, what signals might individual consumers be required to send as attempts of 
collectivisation in order to discharge their remedial responsibility? According to Lawford-
Smith, an effective signal “might be the public buying of ethically produced products, or the 
public boycotting of unethically produced products.”  This initially might seem to 195
contradict the previously discussed arguments against discharging remedial responsibilities 
through consumption choices. However, I believe it does not. Previously, I considered the 
effects that an individual’s ethical consumerism has by virtue of directly contributing to 
demand. It appeared that an individual’s ethical consumerism would be inefficacious when 
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we anticipate it to have an effect on the situation on exploited workers by buying or 
refraining from buying products. However, this reasoning presupposes that the kind of effect 
we are anticipating is directly driving demand. As the discussion of Lawford-Smith shows, 
that is not only way consumers can employ their consumption choices; consumption choices 
can also function as normative expressions. Hence, the impacts of signalling through the 
consumption ethically produced products is not primarily to be found in relation to thresholds 
or in refraining from contributing to demand. Instead, we should conceive of such actions as 
mainly aiming to impact the actions of others. Thus, when an individual buys Fairtrade coffee 
with this in mind, they signal their commitment to its cause and thereby express a normative 
judgement. This may then inspire others who encounter the signal (other customers/store 
owners/companies/friends/family) to act accordingly. In this way, signalling can have a 
consequentialist justification to actions that we would normally view as being inefficacious. 
The chance that an individual’s consumerism impacts other people’s consumption choices is 
much higher than it making a non-negligible impact on consumer demand by itself.  
Whereas such signalling can be employed as a means towards the formation of a new 
collective, signalling can also serve the function of attempting to maintain or transform 
existing collectives. On the one hand, signals can be viewed as continued support for a cause 
and, on the other hand, they can serve as expressions of dissatisfaction with a particular 
course of action. In this way, signalling can also “serve to attract greater membership, or to 
begin the process of reforming the organization’s capacities.”  In relation to large-scale 196
political cases, Collins provides two other collectivising actions. Whereas on the one hand, an 
individual can maintain a humanitarian organisation through donations, one can also attempt 
to transform a corporation by consumer boycotts. To a large extent, I believe that an 
individual’s impact to a collective consumer boycott will be in line with the effect of that of 
individual signalling. In other words, the effect is not to be found in its direct impact on 
consumer demand but with the normative expression that is aimed at lessening perceived 
support for a social norm as well as influencing other consumers. However, whereas 
donations can also be viewed as having a signalling purpose, they can have an impact in other 
ways as well.  
  In recent years, ‘effective altruism’ has received much attention. The idea behind 
 . Lawford-Smith, “Unethical Consumption,” 322. 196
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effective altruism is to donate to causes that make best use of resources in order to maximise 
the good that come from such donations.  In this way, the approach of effective altruism is 197
thoroughly consequentialist; it aims at maximising utility. However, there is much 
disagreement about whether people have an obligation to donate. Whereas it is widely 
accepted that people should refrain from harming others, there is much debate about whether 
there is a similar principle for providing aid to those in need.  For example, Singer, one of 198
the known proponents of effective altruism, has argued that donating in this way does not 
always amount to supererogation.  However, for present purposes, it seems that the 199
disagreement about whether donations are supererogatory or not is not an issue. If what we 
are talking about is discharging remedial responsibilities through donations, such actions are 
neither altruistic, nor supererogatory. Once we incur remedial responsibility, we have an 
obligation to discharge such responsibilities.  
 Nevertheless, effective altruism and discharging remedial responsibilities are two 
distinct phenomena. In discharging remedial responsibilities, we are not necessarily 
concerned with maximising utility. The reason for addressing effective altruism in this 
discussion, then, is different. Effective altruists, such as Singer, donate to organisations that 
make best use of financial resources. By attempting to aid people effectively, donations can 
have significant moral results.  If that is the case, then an individual consumer inspired by 200
effective altruism could perhaps consider discharging their remedial responsibility through 
donating in such a way that their donations have small but significant impacts. In other 
words, one might adopt a comparable approach: discharging remedial responsibilities through 
donating to effective charities. Without adopting the consequentialist approach of maximising 
utility, a consumer could, for instance, donate a percentage of their income to foundations 
that are committed to combating global labour injustices. In this way, a consumer who is 
unable to make a significant impact on consumer demand directly, could perhaps make an 
impact through their financial support. Perhaps, such donations are meant to cover workers’ 
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medical expenses, provide micro financing or pay for the education of a child of a sweatshop 
worker. Moreover, such donations are also important to the functionings of humanitarian 
organisations as a lot of such organisations are dependent on financial contributions. By 
donating, a consumer could aim to maintain and uphold such a collective’s efforts. In 
addition, besides the actual impacts of a financial donation, they also communicate a signal. 
Such signals are likely to be encountered by the charitable organisations themselves in the 
first place, but potentially also by friends or one’s social media followers. Hence, it seems 
that at least in some cases, a consumer could discharge remedial responsibilities through 
financial donations. 
   
3.3 Efficacy and Demandingness 
As I have argued at length about the demandingness as well as inefficaciousness of 
discharging remedial responsibility by attempting to affect consumer demand through 
consumption choices, I will have to make the case that the types of actions presented in this 
chapter do not face the same problems. Therefore, arguments will need to be provided that 
show that political actions such as voting, protesting and petitioning as well as signalling 
through ethical consumerism will not be too demanding or prove to be inefficacious with 
respect to their outcomes. I will turn to efficacy first.  
 Earlier, I discussed Sinnott-Armstrong’s account on the inefficacy problem. Due to 
the fact that he could not find a convincing principle as to why individuals ought not to 
contribute to the emission of greenhouse gasses, Sinnott-Armstrong conceded that individuals 
should instead invest their efforts in taking political action. However, Sinnott-Armstrong has 
been criticised on the irony of this conclusion. According to Hiller, “the very same arguments 
that he gives against the causal insignificance of driving can be made about the causal 
insignificance of political efforts.”  As an example, Hiller points to voting in elections.  201 202
Admittedly, a single vote will almost always not make a difference in national elections. 
However, Hiller’s reasoning presupposes that political acts such as voting only serve their 
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direct function. In this regard, Hiller seems to neglect the fact that political efforts also 
function as normative expressions. As previously discussed, political acts such as voting can 
be seen as signals to other people about what morally desirable behaviour is. Analogous to 
voting, an individual’s contribution to a boycott, protest or petition will often not be 
efficacious with respect to the success of such a collective effort. In this sense, joining an 
already coordinated political endeavour might prove not to be efficacious in terms of its 
direct impact. Similarly, an individual’s financial contribution to a political campaign or 
humanitarian organisation might not have a significant impact on its success. Nevertheless, 
an individual’s contribution can be efficacious through sending out signals to other agents. 
Therefore, the efficaciousness of an individual’s participation in political efforts should not 
only be apprehended in terms of direct contributions, but also in terms of its expressive value. 
Such actions are aimed at showing a collective willingness as well as aim to persuade others 
to act accordingly. Therefore, a signalling individual’s actions are not only aimed at directly 
affecting a cause’s outcome. Instead, these actions aim at influencing other agents with the 
goal of forming, maintaining or transforming a collective that can have a significant impact.  
When it comes to demandingness, one might object that ethical consumerism still 
remains to be excessively burdensome. Naturally, all attempts to discharge remedial 
responsibility will come at some cost. Whereas some actions such as writing letters or 
protesting may be time consuming, other actions such as donating or buying ethically 
produced products might be more financially costly. Nevertheless, I have previously argued 
that discharging remedial responsibility through ethical consumerism is excessively 
burdensome. Whereas other collectivising efforts do not seem to be particularly demanding, 
my analysis of ethical consumerism showed that attempting to find out all the ethical 
implications of a given product or ethical label amounts to a very demanding, if not 
impossible, task. Hence, it might seem inconsistent to now claim that in order to signal 
consumers ought to consume ethically after all. However, it is important here to distinguish 
the two phenomena. Whereas it indeed seems too burdensome and complicated to find out 
about the actual direct effects of one’s consumption and act accordingly, it does not mean that 
the same applies for signalling. Although it might be the case that these two approaches 
occasionally coincide, there is an important reason as to why signalling would be 
significantly less demanding. More specifically, it seems that signalling does away with some 
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of the epistemic burden around labels. In other words, in order to send out a reliable signal an 
individual does not have to be informed about the actual effects that labels have to the same 
extent that they would need to be if they are aiming to affect demand directly. Due to the 
expressive nature of signalling, it suffices to buy products that sufficiently represent the 
ethical cause. In this way, there is still an epistemic burden to signalling. However, it seems 
that a consumer who aims to send out a reliable signal can cease their epistemic investigation 
into ethical labels as well as products somewhat earlier than those who aim to find out the 
actual as well as precise effects of their consumption choices. For signalling, what is 
important is that an ethical label or product sufficiently represents the values they stand for. 
For example, a consumer does not have to be aware of the all the actual effects of Fairtrade 
products. As long as the Fairtrade label is sufficiently perceived as ‘an ethical choice’, a 
consumer who buys Fairtrade coffee expresses their support to its cause. In this way, the 
expressive values represented by consumption choices stand somewhat detached from its 
actual effects. If it appears that a particular label is not adequately achieving what it aims to 
achieve, consumers could then boycott the label to signal a desire for transformation. For 
example, if a consumer is informed about a scandal surrounding Fairtrade products, they have 
reason to stop signalling in favour of it. Taking these considerations into account, it does 
appears that signalling would still be somewhat epistemically demanding. However, it would 
be less demanding than precisely finding out about all the intricate as well as actual effects of 
consumption choices.  
 In this chapter, I have discussed various potential ways of discharging remedial 
responsibilities. It appears that in order to discharge remedial responsibility individuals ought 
to take steps towards collectivisation. When realised, a capable collective could then yield 
significant impacts on global labour injustices. As means towards collectivisation and in line 
with Lawford-Smith’s account, I argued that individuals ought to signal their willingness to 
come together and act collectively. Not only can individuals signal through, for example, 
petitions and protests, they can employ the normative expressive power of their consumption 
choices. Such signals can be effective in showing a willingness to come together and act 




The starting point of this thesis was the morally unacceptable situation of exploited workers 
around the globe. In light of their situation, I raised the question of whether individuals bear 
some responsibility for these global labour injustices. In addition, I posed the question what 
individuals ought to do in case it would appear that individuals do bear such responsibilities. 
Throughout, I have used the phenomena of sweatshops as the paradigmatic example of a 
global labour injustice. In order to find an answer concerning responsibilities, I examined 
Young’s account of political responsibility. Although Young’s framework is an important 
contribution in thinking about responsibility for global labour injustices, it appeared that it 
fell short of providing action guiding principles. Therefore, I turned to Miller, whose 
connection theory of remedial responsibility appeared to be conceptually close to Young’s 
account, yet proved to be more applicable. The application of Miller’s connection theory led 
to the conclusion that corporations are most strongly connected to the injustices. However, I 
argue that because of the objectionable inaction on the side of corporations, consumers incur 
more remedial responsibility. Next, I discussed three arguments against the position that 
remedial responsibility for global labour injustice incurred by consumers should also be 
discharged by consumers as consumers, through directly attempting to affect consumer 
demand. It appeared that although this way of discharging remedial responsibility does not 
seem to be in contravention with democratic principles, it would amount to an ineffective as 
well as excessively burdensome epistemic task. However, the considerations of the last 
chapter show that that conclusion presupposes that the effect we are anticipating by 
consuming ethically is an impact on the unjust situation of workers by directly driving 
demand. After all, consumption choices also function as normative expressions. Hence, 
besides other collectivising efforts such as petitioning, protesting, donating and voting, 
consumers can signal their willingness to come together and act collectively by consuming 
ethical products. I followed Lawford-Smith in claiming that the least an individual ought to 
do, is avoid being the reason others believe that other people are not willing to come together 
and act collectively. It appeared that signalling through ethical consumerism is still a 
somewhat demanding task, epistemically as well as financially. However, it is considerably 
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less demanding than attempting to directly affect consumer demand through ethical 
consumerism. Therefore, I concluded that in order for a consumer to discharge their remedial 
responsibility for global labour injustice, they ought to take steps towards collectivisation of 
which sending signals by consuming ethical products is one way.   
 Naturally, it can be argued that this thesis is subject to various shortcomings. For 
instance, one could object that there are too many remaining questions. One might wonder 
about how to decide which particular collectivising steps an individual ought to take. Should 
a consumer signal by buying ethical products as long as there are other people around to 
perceive the signal? Do these considerations lead to the conclusion that it is permissible for a 
consumer to consume cheaper, non-ethical products in private as long as they donate any 
price differences to relevant charitable organisations? Does it count as successfully 
discharging remedial responsibility when an individual pretends to consume ethically by 
sending out ethical signals on social media platforms, when in reality this individual is 
‘faking’ their ethical consumerism. How often is an individual required to signal and how 
‘loud’ should the signal be? These are questions that I cannot fully address here, but I will 
make two brief comments: firstly, discharging remedial responsibility is not only about ‘clean 
hands’ consumerism as described by Hussain. If discharging remedial responsibilities was 
solely about clean hands then it would suffice for consumers to only focus on their 
consumption choices. However, remedial responsibility is concerned with providing remedy. 
By adopting a forward-looking approach that gives rise to a different way of thinking, a strict 
focus on people’s consumption choices seems misguided. Secondly, my suspicion is that 
demandingness as well as effectiveness provide some guidance in thinking about what is 
required of individual consumers in order to discharge remedial responsibility. Therefore, I 
believe that it will vary from person to person. Some people might have a lot of free time in 
which they can join protests or write letters. Others might have demanding jobs that pay a lot 
of money. Perhaps those people should donate instead. Besides these contextual factors, there 
is something to say about ethical convictions. By and large, I have attempted to refrain from 
taking a particular deontological, consequentialist or virtue ethical stance. Since the current 
discussion concerns discharging remedial responsibilities, it seems that an individual is 
required to at least produce some outcome in order to count as effectively discharging 
responsibility. However, as there are multiple actions individuals could perform with a view 
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towards collectivisation, it seems that there are different ways to discharge remedial 
responsibility. I believe that which of these particular discharging actions are required of an 
individual will, to some extent, depend on their individual circumstances as well as which 
moral principles are correct. 
In the first chapter, I discussed a dissatisfaction with Young’s account of political 
responsibility and voiced the need to supplement it with Miller’s account of remedial 
responsibility. Interestingly, however, I seem to arrive at discharging acts that would fall 
under Young’s broad description of politics. In my last chapter, I included her definition of 
her broad conception of politics. In it, Young specifically denotes actions in which people 
organise collectively. In addition, she refers to the communicative activities in which people 
try to persuade one another. Hence, it appears that my conclusions about the need to signal 
and collectivise are very much in line with the way Young conceived of her notion of political 
responsibility. Nevertheless, Young’s aim was to make sense of claims of responsibility that 
were being made by the anti-sweatshop movement at the time as well as provide guidelines in 
thinking about these matters. Her goal was not necessarily to answer the question of what an 
individual ought to do in light of global labour injustice. By aiming to answer that question, I 
have attempted to expand on Young’s account and contribute to the discussion surrounding 
responsibility for global labour injustice.  
 Throughout, I focussed on global labour injustice. I argued that individuals from 
relatively affluent countries stand in connection to these labour injustices by virtue of 
consuming products that have been produced under exploitative working conditions. 
Correspondingly, I claimed that this connection, at least to some extent, gives rise to remedial 
responsibility. Hence, one might wonder what the implications of my conclusions are for 
other injustices. For instance, does this mean that through consuming meat, individuals incur 
a remedial responsibility for the harms inflicted on animals in factory farms? Does it mean 
that an individual who travels by airplane incurs a remedial responsibility for climate change? 
Do smartphone owners bear remedial responsibility for unjust natural resource depletion and 
its associated wars? These are difficult questions to answer. The conclusions I have drawn in 
this thesis derive from the specific application of the different dimensions of Miller’s 
connection theory to the case of global labour injustice. Other morally unacceptable states of 
affairs will involve different agents and therefore different connections will be discerned. 
82
Therefore, it is likely that remedial responsibilities will also be assigned in a different 
manner. That being said, it does appear that the consumption of goods and services 
constitutes a connection. Will that connection make consumers remedially responsible for 
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